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Truth and Legitimacy (In Courts)
Kenneth S. Klein*
This Article seeks to comprehensively articulate the meaning, role, and
importance of truth in courts by drawing upon empirical and theoretical
scholarship from philosophy, economics, social science, psychology,
political science, ethics, and jurisprudence, in addition to more
traditional legal sources such as United States Supreme Court decisions.
It is frequently said that trials are a search for truth. But as insiders to
the judicial system know, if this is so, then it is a meaning of truth that
differs from what truth means in any other context. And exposing this
definitional dissonance, in turn exposes that the legitimacy of the courts
rests on an eroding foundation, as courts increasingly are not doing what
the community believes courts are doing. This Article argues that when
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courts do not account for lay perceptions of courts as institutions that
primarily value accuracy in decision making, courts jeopardize the
legitimacy of courts as public institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to answer what the meaning of truth is in American
trial courts,1 and why one should care. As big as this inquiry sounds, it
is tied up in equally large subsidiary questions—the meaning in courts of
justification, of knowledge, and of belief, which in turn implicate the
meaning in courts of fairness, due process, justice, accuracy, and fact.
Only upon answering these questions can one explore the foundation of
the courts’ legitimacy, and how both the meaning of truth in courts—and
the public perception of the role of truth in courts—relate to the actual
legitimacy of the courts.
This is no small task. There is scant academic literature studying the
meaning of truth in courts. What has been written about the role of truth
in legal systems largely exists in the ephemeral context of jurisprudence,
rather than the concrete world of the truth-finding function of trials.
Part I of this Article adopts the multi-millennia work of philosophy in
defining truth as a roadmap to isolating the nature of truth in courts. Part
I.A of this Article attempts to very, very briefly summarize the
philosophical literature on truth to isolate a construction of truth that can
advance an understanding of truth in courts. Within epistemology, a
court-like pragmatic construction of truth is the weak deflationism
definition of truth within realism, which sees truth as a binomial property
that a proposition has (or not). It is either true, or it is not. Court decisions
about facts are similarly binomial: guilty/not guilty or liable/not liable.
Weak deflationism sees truth as residing in a constellation of truth-related
concepts—knowledge, certainty, and belief—each of which leans on the
other to derive its meaning and role. Simply put, knowledge requires
truth, justification, and belief.
This formulation of the role of truth facilitates isolating the meaning
of truth in courts. Part I.B of this Article explores justification in trial
courts. In trial courts, justification is defined by the Federal Rules of
Evidence (“Rules”), which directly delineate what counts as a “fact” in
front of a jury. Perhaps surprisingly, the Rules do not consider all
pertinent information as facts in determining trials, but rather routinely
discard facts for one of two reasons: (1) the facts presumptively are
considered beyond the evaluative skillset of the decision maker; or (2)
consideration of the facts, while advancing a trial decision, undermine a
policy goal—external to the merits of the case—considered more
1. The United States federal district courts created pursuant to Article III of the United States
Constitution, and the trial courts of general civil and criminal jurisdiction of the various States of
the United States. This Article sometimes collectively refers to these courts as the “American
courts.”
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important than the accuracy of trial outcomes. Part I.B concludes that, in
justifying a trial judgment, not all facts matter.
Part I.C of this Article explores knowledge in courts. Knowledge is
the degree of certainty that must be reached, in light of the goals of the
process, to stop gathering information and move to taking action.
Knowledge is a compromise or balance between certainty and finality,
between perfection and adequacy. It is what one might call the necessary
and sufficient degree of accuracy. This is a common balancing
determination that exits in any information-gathering, decision-making
endeavor: How much confidence does one need in gathered information
to act? Justice systems articulate their balance of accuracy and finality
through burdens of proof. The burdens of proof expose that knowledge
in courts means reaching a “correct enough” resolution—biasing toward
certainty when the stakes involve liberty—and staying near neutral when
the stakes are the sort of private relationships courts resolve in civil
litigation.
Part I.D of this Article explores belief in courts. Belief in courts is the
“why” of the justice system: What is the role of courts in society, and
what do we need from them? Exploration of these questions exposes
fracture lines between procedural justice and substantive justice, between
individual fairness and communal fairness, and between objective justice
and subjective justice. In the end, belief in courts means the courts have
procedures for dispute resolution that society generally perceives and
accepts as a fair opportunity—or perhaps a fair enough opportunity—to
present one’s position to a neutral decision maker.
Part I.E of this Article draws a conclusion about the meaning of truth
in courts. Truth as used in the justice system is “accuracy enough,”
meaning there has been an adequate procedural process to support a
general, communal sense of systemic fairness without regard to the
outcome of a particular case.
Part II of this Article examines the possible tension between the
meaning of truth in courts on the one hand, and the basis of the legitimacy
of courts as a societal institution on the other hand. What emerges from
a formulation of the actual meaning of truth in courts is that the public
perception of the truth-finding function of courts is at odds with the
inside, systemic meaning of the truth-finding function of courts.
The social science construct of Legitimacy Theory studies why
members of American society broadly accept the legitimacy of societal
institutions. Legitimacy Theory has been brought to fruition as a way to
understand why Americans generally accept the legitimacy of the United
States Supreme Court, even in the face of decisions with which the
individual disagrees. But there is little analytical work focusing on the
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legitimacy of the trial courts. There is no work at all concentrating on
whether a misperception of what courts do undermines the legitimacy of
the trial courts.
Thus, the latter half of this Article begins to fill those gaps. A review
of the extant Legitimacy Theory literature on the courts and an
application of the lessons from identifying the meaning of truth in courts
isolate reasons to be concerned that the misperception of what trial courts
do might undermine trial court legitimacy. Finally, this Article draws a
tentative conclusion that judges’ unawareness of a “legitimacy” concern
is driving jurisprudence in potentially problematic directions.
I. TRUTH IN COURTS
The truth-finding function of trial courts begs for explication. Judges,
lawyers, and academics often say that trials are a search for truth.2 If so,
then it would seem to be a different meaning of truth than the meaning of
the word in any other context, because what actually reaches
admissibility at the trial level is never the “whole truth” in any nuanced
sense of those words. Yet there is little legal literature directly addressing
the nature of the truth in the law generally, or in courts specifically.
That is perhaps understandable. Deconstructing the nature of truth in
any context is a daunting challenge. Philosophy literally has dedicated
millennia to the task.3 But by doing so, philosophy provides a possible
shortcut—an analytical base and map to the task.

2. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (“[T]he very nature of a trial [is] a
search for truth.”); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic
purpose of a trial is the determination of truth . . . .”); United States v. Gray, 897 F.2d 1428, 1429
(8th Cir. 1990) (“A trial is a search for truth . . . .”); Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence,
Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 567 (2013) (“We begin with a simple,
but oft-neglected, observation: The coin of the legal realm is truth.”). But see G. Kristian Miccio,
Giles v. California: Is Justice Scalia Hostile to Battered Women?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 93, 95 (2009)
(“[A]s currently structured, our adversarial process is many things, but it is not a search for truth.”);
accord Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1032 (1975) (“[O]ur adversary system rates truth too low among the values that institutions of
justice are meant to serve.”). Notably, even these critics appear to assume that the courts should
be seeking truth.
3. Michael Glanzenberg, Truth, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/ (“Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also
one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years.”).
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A. Truth in Philosophy as a Template to Understanding Truth in
Courts4
Philosophy directly studies the nature of “truth.”5 For as long as there
has been philosophy, philosophers have pondered questions, stated in laylike terms, such as: Can we define the truth?6 What is real?7 Is there a
reality external to our ability to perceive it?8 How can one know and test
the truth?9 Are moral propositions about the world verifiable?10 Is truth
paradoxical and therefore incoherent?11 The debate over these, and many
other transcendent philosophical questions about truth, is robust, ancient,
and ongoing.12
The parallel academic debate about truth in law occurs within the study
of “jurisprudence.”13 Jurisprudence posits truth inquiries such as what it
4. This section of this Article carries an enormous caveat: the philosophical study of truth has
been the focus of countless papers, dissertations, books, careers, and entire fields of study. The
terminology and conceptual architecture of that work provides a useful conceptual frame for this
Article. But there is no way to delve into the area without gross oversimplification both
conceptually and in the way jargon and terminology are deployed. One simply cannot capture the
breadth and richness of that work in a few pages. A reader sophisticated in the field will
immediately spot the slippage that comes from simplification. It is unavoidable. That is why while
I will—within in the confines of simplification—endeavor to be as precise as possible with how I
am using particular terminology, I also will attempt to be clear when the terminology I am using is
similar in meaning, but not identical to how it might be used in the academic literature of
philosophy.
5. See, e.g., BARRY ALLEN, TRUTH IN PHILOSOPHY 1 (1993) (questioning assumptions made
about truth in philosophical discourse).
6. See generally Gottlob Frege, Der Gedanke. Ein logische Untersuchung, in BERITRAGE ZUR
PHILOSOPHIE DES DEUTSCHEN IDEALISMUS 1, 58–77 (1918), translated in COLLECTED PAPERS
ON MATHEMATICS, LOGIC, AND PHILOSOPHY 351–72 (1984), reprinted in PROPOSITIONS AND
ATTITUDES 33–55, (1988) (exploring the cognitive phenomenon of accepting something as true).
7. See D. M. ARMSTRONG, TRUTH AND TRUTHMAKERS 1 (2004) (examining counterfactuals
and what makes truths true).
8. See generally CRISPIN WRIGHT, TRUTH & OBJECTIVITY (1992) (proposing a new framework
for the discussion of realism in philosophical inquiry).
9. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 7, at 4 (exploring the theory of truth making and truth’s impact
on one’s nature of mind).
10. See SCOTT SOAMES, UNDERSTANDING TRUTH 32–39 (1999) (studying whether one can
verify truth and falsity).
11. See id. at 49–56 (questioning whether truth can be understood).
12. See ALLEN, supra note 5, at 178–79 (exploring the concept of truth in philosophy).
13. See, e.g., 15 LAW AND LANGUAGE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 42 (Michael Freeman & Fiona
Smith eds., 2013) (noting that jurisprudence and “theories about truth in law . . . create unique
challenges” and that “[d]isputes about truth in law are tried to, and motivated by, other significant
jurisprudential debates”); DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 169 (1996) (discussing assertions
of truth in the context of jurisprudence); Jules L. Coleman, Truth and Objectivity in Law, 1 LEGAL
THEORY 33 (1995) (noting “contemporary jurisprudences have not addressed a variety of issues
regarding the semantics and metaphysics of legal disclosure”); see generally THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW (R.M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (discussing important writings in major areas of philosophical
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means to say that a legal proposition—for example, “murder is bad”—is
true (ontology)14, and how the answer to that inquiry is determined
(epistemology).15 Both are classic philosophical inquiries about truth.16
The kind of truth inquiry that occurs in trial courts, however, is
different from the truth inquiries of jurisprudence. It is more pragmatic
and pedantic. Courts ask questions such as, “Did the accused do it?”;
“Was the defense proportionate to the attack?”; “Which car had the green
light?”; or “Did the person act as a reasonably prudent person would act?”
Each of these questions is a variant of the underlying question, “What
happened?”
There is essentially no academic literature on the nature of those truth
inquiries, which one might shorthand as an attempt to understand the
meaning of truth in courts. And yet understanding how to “truthfully”
answer the pragmatic inquiry—“what happened?”—is as elusive as the
more abstract jurisprudential inquiries about truth.17
Seeking a pragmatic definition of truth most closely approximates the
epistemological theory of “weak deflationism,” which is a form of
“realism.” Philosophical definitions of truth broadly can be divided into
realism and anti-realism:
Realism involves at least the claim that there is reality independent of
us and our minds, and that what we think, understand and recognize
does not necessarily exhaust what that reality involves. The facts may
go beyond anything we are capable of ascertaining, but the truth is so
by virtue of those facts and that reality. . . . The question at issue,
therefore, is whether what is to be understood in any proposition lies
simply in what sort of fact makes it true—in other words in its truthinquiry).
14. Ontology is the branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature of being or existence.
Ontology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ontology (last
visited Sept. 8, 2016).
15.
Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the
study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are
the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its
structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to
answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What
makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one’s own mind?
Matthias Steup, Epistemology, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 14, 2005),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/.
16. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing the truth-making theory).
17. Accord Brian H. Bix, Linguistic Meaning and Legal Truth, in 15 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES:
LAW AND LANGUAGE 34, 34–35 (Michael Freeman & Fiona Smith eds., 2013). Bix begins his
essay on “legal truth” by quipping—paraphrasing Augustine—that truth is something we all know
until we are asked to explain it. Id. at 34.
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conditions. Anti-realism holds that . . . to understand a proposition we
need also to know its verification-conditions; we need, that is, a
recognition of when the truth-conditions apply, and when we are
justified in holding that they do.18

Put another way—and admittedly perhaps too simply—realism posits
that there is objective, external “truth,” while anti-realism asserts that
truth is variable by context, meaning that a system contributes to create
and define truth in that system. Within realism, the most concrete
definition of truth comes from the “minimalism” version of
“deflationism”—also known as “weak deflationism”—which defines
truth as a property that a “proposition” has (or not). A proposition is
either true or it is false.19
The truth formulation of realism—and within realism, of weak
deflationism—is a close analog to the truth-finding function of trial
courts. A system that self-describes itself as a “search for truth” is
describing a realism understanding of truth—in other words, that truth is
external to the system and potentially discernable. A system that bases
actual judgments on the evaluation of competing versions of events is
describing a weak deflationism understanding of truth. In other words,
this system is concluding that each version of “what happened” is, in the
end, either true or false.
The weak-deflationism formulation of truth is that truth is a component
of knowledge.20 More precisely, knowledge requires truth, belief, and
justification.21 Put more usefully for this Article’s purpose, an
understanding of knowledge, justification, and belief advances an
understanding of actual truth.22

18. D. W. HAMLYN, METAPHYSICS 28–29 (1984).
19. See Glen Hoffman, The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns, 5 PHIL.
COMPASS 938, 938–49 (2010) (detailing minimalism’s role in the deflationary theory of truth);
Scott Soames, Understanding Deflationism, 17 PHIL. PERSP. 369, 377–78 (2003) (discussing the
deflationary theory of truth and why truth is deflationary).
20. See, e.g., Donald Davidson, A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, in TRUTH AND
INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DONALD DAVIDSON 307, 307–19
(Ernest LePore ed., 1986). Stated simply, we may or may not know whether a proposition is true
(false)—its truth property is independent of our knowledge of it.
21. See Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Certainty, 18 PHIL. ISSUES 35, 35–57 (2008) (discussing
the connection between knowledge and certainty). Accord KEITH LEHRER, THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE 20–21 (2d ed. 2000) (examining theories of knowledge and how claims of knowledge
can be justified).
22. Whether a proposition is true is different from whether we know a proposition is true,
whether we can know it, whether if we can know it then how we can know it, whether to know it
must we be certain of it, whether certainty is attainable, how certainty differs from belief, and what
justifies belief short of certainty.
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How, then, are knowledge, justification, and belief defined within
philosophy? Professor Keith Lehrer begins the second edition of his
book, A Theory of Knowledge, by writing, “[a]ll agree that knowledge is
valuable, but agreement about knowledge tends to end there.
Philosophers disagree about what knowledge is, about how to get it, and
even whether there is any to be gotten.”23 Instinctively, one might say
that to “know” something—to be justified in the belief of the truth of a
proposition—corresponds to what, colloquially, one might think of as
certainty.
Perhaps not surprisingly, there are robust and complex dialogues
amongst gifted philosophers, spanning generations, over a proper
definition of certainty.24 This, in turn, obscures one’s ability to
confidently define knowledge as certainty.25 But for purposes of this
Article, it is unnecessary to try to resolve these perhaps intractably
opposing positions. One can define knowledge as an “intuitive” form of
certainty—one that avoids the skeptical arguments against both epistemic
and subjective definitions of certainty.26
An intuitive form of certainty can be described as the level of
understanding or explanation that is achieved when all that is possible to
be known is known, leaving no room for an alternative explanation. In
other words, intuitive certainty is not subjective, but rather is based on
the highest level of available justification; but intuitive certainty is not
epistemic in that it acknowledges that there may be unavailable
information that would support an alternative conclusion.27 The
weakness of subjective certainty should be apparent: one can be
subjectively certain, and yet still wrong.28 The weakness of epistemic (or
“actual”) certainty is equally patent—actual certainty may be
theoretically impossible, and even if actual certainty is theoretically
possible, in any practical sense absolute certainty is unattainable.29 Put
23. LEHRER, supra note 21, at 1.
24. Baron Reed, Certainty, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 2, 2008),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/certainty/.
25. Id.; see also Stanley, supra note 21, at 35–57 (explaining the connection between knowledge
and certainty).
26. Stanley, supra note 21, at 32, 37.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; accord SOAMES, supra note 10, at 29–32 (questioning whether actual certainty is
attainable); Introduction to THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 8–9 (R. M. Dworkin ed., 1977) (describing
how a legal positivist—an anti-realist—believes that “no sense can be assigned to a proposition
unless those who use that proposition are all agreed about how the proposition could, at least in
theory, be proved conclusively.” Dworkin criticizes this view because it means that no
controversial proposition of law can be true.).
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another way, even if time and resources were unlimited, intuitive
certainty describes how the closest one could come to actual certainty and
therefore attainable knowledge.
In philosophy, a definition of justification is also elusive and
contentious.30 For purposes of this Article, a crude statement of the
“foundationalism” theory of justification is sufficient. Meaning, a belief
in the truth of a proposition is justified when it is derived from predicates
external to the proposition and that are experienced through the senses.31
In other words, justification is an evaluation of the strength of the
available information.
Belief in philosophical jargon is “the attitude we have, roughly,
whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true.”32 It is
hard to succinctly describe this meaning of belief in a way that is both
accessible to the non-philosopher and fits within a normal meaning of the
word. Perhaps belief is best thought of as what separates wheat from
chaff; it sorts random conclusions from conclusions that advance the
purposes of the endeavor in which one is engaged.33 Or put even another
way, when gathering information one has a context—a system purpose—
that identifies which data justifies a conclusion that a proposition is true
(or false). H. L. A. Hart alluded to the same idea when he wrote that the
inquiry “what is law” should be answered by considering which concerns
motivated the question.34 Crudely speaking, the consideration of
“concerns motivating the question” describes the role of belief in
knowledge.35
In sum, within weak deflationism, knowledge requires truth,
justification, and belief. The inquiries of the nature of each of these
concepts are the truth inquiries—the questions a particular construct of
truth posits, emphasizes, and explores—of weak deflationists. These
30. See, e.g., Erik Olsson, Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Nov. 15, 2012), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/
(examining how the coherence theory of justification can be used to analyze knowledge).
31. See Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan, Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/
(discussing noninferential justification and objections to classical foundationalism).
32. Eric Schwitzgebel, Belief, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/.
33. See generally LEHRER, supra note 21, at 32–41, 72–76, 93, 124–25 (discussing the
relationship between knowledge and belief).
34. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 5 (2d ed. 1994) (questioning how to explain
law). There is some irony to quoting Hart in an Article that uses nonlegal disciplines as an analog,
as Hart began his own book by contending that law is alone among disciplines in being introspective
about what it is and why it is doing what it is doing. Id. at 1.
35. See LEHRER, supra note 21, at 12–14 (discussing the relationship between knowledge and
belief).
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truth inquiries suggest a template for how to formulate a meaning of truth
in courts—one should isolate the role of truth in courts by first exploring
the meaning of knowledge, belief, and justification in courts.
But one should not jump into this approach naively. While weak
deflationism is an analog for the truth-finding function of trial courts, the
truth inquiries of weak deflationism are not identical to the truth inquiries
of the courts.
Most obviously, the truth inquiry in courts diverges from a philosophy
that courts seek knowledge that is a step down—perhaps many steps
down—from “intuitive certainty.”
Yet this difference does not
undermine the utility of using philosophical jargon and analysis to
understand what courts mean by truth, because what courts do is still
within the defined terminology of philosophy. In particular, an
acceptable epistemological definition of “probability” is the likelihood
that a proposition one believes to be true is true.36 So in the philosophical
jargon of “knowledge,” the knowledge courts seek is a systemically
defined “probability” on a spectrum of knowledge, which is less than
“intuitive certainty” but more than impossibility.
Put slightly differently, what courts are doing when they seek the truth
is—and essentially must be—seeking an adequately justified belief about
what happened in a case.37 Disputes must have an end at some point, and
knowledge in the philosophical sense requires the unattainable goal of
absolute—or even intuitive—certainty.38 Coarsely stated, courts settle
for “knowledge enough,” based on a “justified enough” “belief enough”
that a conclusion is “true enough”—meaning that for purposes of the
courts, there is an acceptable likelihood that the courts’ perception and

36. It should be apparent that essentially every single term or word in philosophy is more
nuanced and debatable than the discussion of this Article can capture. For example, there are at
least three definitions of “probability,” none of which are devoid of objections. See LEHRER, supra
note 21, at 86–94 (detailing the advantages and objections of three formulations of “probability”).
But for purposes of this Article, the above definition fits within all three, and will suffice.
37. See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1295–97 (1982) (discussing the use of
probabilities by factfinders); accord SOAMES, supra note 10, at 31 (analyzing the use of belief by
courts to find truth).
38. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994) (presenting an economic analysis of the value of accuracy
in adjudication). See also Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the
American Way, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 43, 47–48 (2004) (“When we need the answer to some question
in a hurry, we may be obliged to curtail our search for further evidence . . . . [W]here some action
must be taken now, . . . we have no choice but to decide what to do on the basis of whatever evidence
we have . . . .”).
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judgment of what happened corresponds to what actually happened.39
So, one must recognize that the meaning of knowledge, justification,
belief, and truth likely are analogous, but certainly differ between weak
deflationists and the courts. It is within this caveat that the weak
deflationism formulation of truth can overcome the otherwise apparently
over-daunting task of enunciating a comprehensive formulation of truth
in courts. Just as within weak deflationism, knowledge requires truth,
justification, and belief, one can posit that knowledge in courts (a perhaps
highly imperfect form of knowledge that is a degree of indeterminate
probability materially below intuitive certainty) requires: (a perhaps
imperfect form of) truth (truth in courts), (a perhaps imperfect form of)
justification (justification in courts), and (a perhaps imperfect form of)
belief (belief in courts).
One can then infer that to better understand40 the nature and import of
truth in courts, one must explore more deeply the meaning of justification
in courts, the meaning of knowledge in courts, and the meaning of belief
in courts.
B. Understanding Justification in Courts
The philosophical definition of justification is “the predicates external
to the proposition . . . which are experienced through the senses.”41 This
readily translates to trials. In trial, the proposition is guilty/not guilty, or
liable/not liable; the predicates external to that proposition that are
experienced through the senses are the various sources of information—
witness accounts, records, physical proof—that bear on the
understanding of that proposition. More simply, justification in courts is
the set of data that counts as a fact—the admissible evidence. To better
understand justification in courts, one can look at what counts as a fact in
trials, and why.

39. In this context, I am comfortable conflating two concepts—probability (an estimate as to
the likelihood of a given fact being true) and confidence (how sure one can be about a probability
estimate given the information available)—that in other legal, doctrinal contexts should not be
conflated. See generally Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the Constitutionality of
Summary Judgment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (2014) (discussing three types of judgment the
court uses when entering summary judgment). Also, a court judgment, of course, not only
determines “what happened,” but also what consequences append to that determination. This
Article confines itself to the “what happened” function of judgments because the “consequences
determination” function of judgments is not part of the truth inquiry of the courts (as this Article
defines the truth inquiry aspect of trials).
40. I use the phrasing “better understand” as I am mindful of Keith Lehrer’s assertion (and
explanation) that “a complete theory of truth is impossible.” LEHRER, supra note 21, at 29.
41. See Fumerton & Hasan, supra note 31 (discussing sense data).
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1. The Rules of Evidence Define What Counts as a Fact in Courts
The Federal Rules of Evidence42 provide a detailed source of the
meaning of justification in courts.43 Professor John Leubsdorf analyzes
the Rules as a set of ex ante incentives for adversaries.44 But for this
Article’s purposes, the Rules serve a much more concrete function—the
Rules themselves are where the American courts set forth an explicit
delineation of what information is admissible evidence (i.e., what counts
as a “fact”).45
“Relevant” evidence is what rises to the level of a “fact” in trials. Rule
401 of the Rules defines “relevant” evidence as any information that
bears even slightly on anything of consequence in a trial.46 Under Rule
401, all relevant evidence is presumed admissible, but Rule 402 defines
“inadmissible” as any information that fails to meet the Rule 401
threshold.47 The remainder of the Rules either set forth administrative
matters concerning such things as who is competent to be a witness or the
order of examination, or detail when otherwise relevant evidence
nonetheless is not admissible. Most of the Rules fall into the latter
category; in other words, the Rules set forth ways that relevant evidence
still does not count as a trial fact, and thus cannot act as legal justification
in a trial.

42. This portion of the Article is based on the substantive content of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. While each state has its own evidence code, in substance the content of the large majority
of those codes is virtually identical to the content of the federal rules. 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF
EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin et al. eds., 2016) (noting that
forty-four states have adopted rules of evidence based on the Federal Rules of Evidence).
43. But see John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1212
(2006) (detailing the tacit assumptions involved in evidence law and the resistance to innovations);
see also Mark Cammack, Evidence Rules and the Ritual Functions of Trials: “Saying Something
of Something”, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 783, 783 (1992) (“[E]vidence law does not embrace its own
substantive ends, the purposes of evidence law must be determined by reference to the trial which
it is designed to regulate.”).
44. See generally John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law as a System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV.
1621 (2010) (discussing the impact of evidence law on the parties involved in a case); Alex Stein,
Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423 (2015) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence are
motivated by efficiency decisions).
45. Because the text of the rules and of the Advisory Committee notes, as well as numerous
court opinions, often explicitly describe the underlying rationales of the rules, I will not address in
this Article alternative meta-explanations such as Alex Stein’s. See generally Stein, supra note 44
(describing these alternatives).
46. FED. R. EVID. 401.
47. FED. R. EVID. 402.
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2. Procedural and Administrative Rules of Evidence
Some Rules are purely procedural or administrative. These Rules do
not directly bear on what the courts count as a fact. And further, these
Rules do not describe a mechanism either to advance or hinder the
likelihood that a trial outcome will correspond to what actually happened,
which is a description of what courts do that correlates to a justified
knowledge of truth:
Rule Number
Name
Rules that go beyond simply defining terminology, but set forth the scope
of proceedings and describe how to apply and amend the Rules48
Rule 101
Scope; Definitions
Rule 1101
Applicability of the Rules
Rule 1102

Amendments

Rule 1102
Title
The Rule that broadly states the overall goals of the Rules (i.e., fairness,
efficiency, truth, and justice)49
Rule 102
Purpose
Rules that set forth procedures for making and ruling on objections50
Rule 103
Rulings on Evidence
Rule 104
Preliminary Questions
Rule 105
Limiting Evidence That Is Not Admissible Against Other
Parties of for Other Purposes
Rules that set forth the timing of considering evidence and how the jury is
instructed about some evidence51

48. FED. R. EVID. 101, 1101–1103.
49. FED. R. EVID. 102.
50. FED. R. EVID. 103–105.
51. FED. R. EVID. 106, 301–302, 612–613. Some evidence scholars argue that Rules 106 and
612 also are rules of admissibility. See Andrea N. Kochert, Note, The Admission of Hearsay
Through Rule 106: And Now You Know the Rest of the Story, 46 IND. L. REV. 499, 500 (2013)
(describing how Rule 106 is used in the context of admissibility at trial); Dale A. Nance, A Theory
of Verbal Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825, 826–27 (1995) (endorsing the view that the most
important function of the completeness rule is to trump otherwise applicable exclusionary rules);
Thomas M. Tomlinson, Note, Pattern-Based Memory and the Writing Used to Refresh, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 1462, 1481 (1995) (arguing that because a witness may transmit the contents of inadmissible
evidence through Rule 612, the rule can lead to the effective admission of inadmissible evidence
in powerful testimonial form); but see 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6183 (2d ed. 1993) (“Rule 612 is not an independent source
of admissibility, but simply describes a procedure whereby a witness may be assisted in providing
admissible testimony.”). Thought of this way, these two rules facilitate revealing to the fact finder
evidence that otherwise would have been considered injurious to the accuracy of fact finding—in
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Rule Number
Name
Rules that go beyond simply defining terminology, but set forth the scope
of proceedings and describe how to apply and amend the Rules48
Rule 106
Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements
Rule 301
Presumptions in Civil Cases Generally” and “Applying State
Law to Presumptions in Civil Cases
Rule 302
Applying State Law to Presumptions in Civil Cases
Rule 612
Writing Used to Refresh a Witness’s Memory
Rule 613
Witness’s Prior Statements
The Rule that provides a method, external to the presentation of evidence,
to put facts into the record52
Rule 201
Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
Rules that define the parameters of what persons—independent of the
content of their testimony—are competent to take the stand53
Rule 601
Competency to Testify in General
Rule 603
Interpreter

The authentication rules54 and the “Best Evidence Rules”55 are cousins
to the Rules defining persons who can testify as a witness—these rules
define which documents are admissible evidence. In particular, the
authentication rules and the “Best Evidence Rules” regulate forgeries,
copies, and when a party can (or must) put a document into evidence,
rather than simply describe what the document says.
Rules 611 (“Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting
Evidence”), 614 (“Court’s Calling or Examining Witnesses”), 615
(“Excluding Witnesses”), and 706 (“Court-Appointed Expert
Witnesses”) address who may call a witness, when this can be done, how
witnesses may be questioned, and when a witness can hear another
witness testify.56
other words, unwind the premise as to certain kinds of evidence that the evidence will be too
confusing to or improperly weighted by the jury.
52. FED. R. EVID. 201. Within Rule 201 also is an interesting and rare acknowledgement of the
fact-finding role of the jury. See Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is
Unconstitutional, and Why That Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077, 1106–08 (2012–2013) (noting
the fact-finding role of the jury in criminal and civil cases).
53. FED. R. EVID. 601, 603.
54. FED. R. EVID. 901–903.
55. FED. R. EVID. 1001–1008.
56. FED. R. EVID. 611, 614–615. One might also argue that each of these rules has a
paternalistic component—a concern that absent these rules jurors will misapply or improperly
weight particular evidence. John Leubsdorf describes how authentication rules can be thought of
as rules predicated on a distrust of the cognitive abilities of judges and jurors. See John Leubsdorf,
supra note 43, at 1234–41.
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3. Evidence Rules Protecting the Jury
Most of the Rules do seek to advance the likelihood that a trial outcome
will correspond to what actually happened, but many do so in a
counterintuitive way. Intuitively, one might think that in a trial regarding
a convenience store robbery, for example, the accused is more likely
guilty if the accused has a past conviction for a convenience store
robbery; or that if a trial must decide if the traffic light was red, it is
helpful to hear from a witness who can recount that someone else told
him or her that the light was red. Neither of the aforementioned is an
example of conclusive proof, but both are examples of at least some
proof. Yet, at least in trials, where the fact finder is a jury (as opposed to
a judge), the Rules generally, and counterintuitively, treat both of these
examples—and numerous similar examples—as improperly illustrating a
correct determination of what happened. Therefore, the evidence is
inadmissible.
The Rules codify the concern that juries will misunderstand, be
confused by, or improperly weigh certain kinds of evidence.57 The Rules
simply do not trust—and actually come close to being openly derogatory
of—the analytical and emotional abilities of jurors.58 Thus, to maximize
the likelihood that a jury verdict will accurately determine what happened
in a case, the Rules keep arguably relevant evidence away from the jury
based on the presumption that jurors are easily confused and bored.
57. See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 43, at 1210 (“[The land] is a realm founded on the
untrustworthiness of jurors . . . . a presupposition that underlies many evidentiary rules.”). One of
these presuppositions can be described as distinctions “between the strengths and weakness of
jurors.” Id. at 1212. “[T]he accepted view is that much of the law reflects judicial distrust of
jurors.” Id. at 1248. And “[t]he usual manifestation of mistrust is the assertion that jurors will give
too much weight to a given kind of evidence.” Id. at 1248. As a result, “[r]ules preventing juries
from hearing large classes of evidence can best be justified by hypothesizing that their weaknesses
will prevent them from appraising that evidence properly.” Id. at 1253. For a more charitable view
of juries—arguing essentially that judges are no better than juries—see Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1494 (1999) (“The point is
less that we need rules of evidence because we have juries than that we have no mechanism for
enforcing rules of evidence against judges.”). At least one scholar argues that Rules 403, 408, 608,
and 613 also rest on saving litigation time and money. Leubsdorf, supra note 43, at 1211 (“Efforts
to limit the cost and delay of litigation may exclude relevant evidence.”). If so, then this rationale
raises constitutional concerns. See generally Klein, supra note 52 (discussing why Rule 403 is
unconstitutional).
58. As the American Law Institute (“ALI”) reported in promulgating its first Model Code of
Evidence: “The low intellectual capacity of the jury is commonly put forward to justify some, if
not all, of our exclusionary rules. . . . [J]urors are treated as if they were low grade morons.”
Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to AM. LAW INST., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 8 (1942).
Accord GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
271 (3d ed. 1963) (“[I]t is an understatement to describe a jury . . . as a group of twelve people of
average ignorance.”).
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The “derogatory” view of jurors is most directly apparent in Rule 403
(“Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time,
or Other Reasons”).59 This Rule does exactly what its title suggests: it
excludes relevant evidence that a judge believes the jury cannot properly
evaluate. Perhaps a little less directly, that is also the underlying concern
of character evidence rules, closely related impeachment rules, and rules
for who can be a witness.
Rule Number
Name
Character Evidence Rules60
Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
Rule 40461
Methods of Proving Character
Rule 40562
Habit; Routine Practice
Rule 40663
Closely Related Impeachment Rules64
A Witness’s Character for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness
Rule 60865
59. FED. R. EVID. 403.
60. FED. R. EVID. 404–406. See Posner, supra note 57, at 1525 (“The principal concern with
this class of evidence . . . . is the danger that a jury will give [it] too much weight . . . .”). At
common law, the use of character evidence was generally discouraged because of these concerns.
See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (explaining that courts that follow
common law traditions have almost unanimously come to disallow the prosecution to use any
character evidence of the defendant to establish a likelihood of guilt). The Advisory Committee
noted that character evidence:
[T]ends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on
the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man [and]
to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence
in the case shows actually happened.
FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note. The Advisory Committee recognized that evidence
of specific instances of conduct to prove character “possesses the greatest capacity to arouse
prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time,” and consequently, Rule 405 limits the use
of this kind of evidence to cases in which character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee’s note.
61. FED. R. EVID. 404.
62. FED. R. EVID. 405.
63. FED. R. EVID. 406.
64. FED. R. EVID. 608–610, 806. The exceptions to the general rule against character evidence
for propensity purposes are sharply drawn, both in terms of the type of evidence allowed and the
manner in which such evidence may be introduced. For example, Rule 608(a), which allows for
impeachment by reputation or opinion evidence, is “strictly limited to character for veracity” to
“sharpen relevancy, to reduce surprise, waste of time, and confusion.” FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory
committee’s note. Rules 608(b), 609, and 806 have similar safeguards, in addition to the
“overriding protection of Rule 403.” Id. Rule 610 forecloses impeachment by an inquiry into
religious beliefs, because “evidence of atheism is irrelevant to the question of credibility.” 1
GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 46, at 218 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006).
65. FED. R. EVID. 608.
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Rule Number
Name
60
Character Evidence Rules
Impeachment by Evidence of a Criminal Conviction
Rule 60966
67
Religious Beliefs or Opinions
Rule 610
68
Attacking and Supporting the Declarant’s Credibility
Rule 806
Rules for Who Can Be a Witness69
Need for Personal Knowledge
Rule 60270
Oath or Affirmation to Testify Truthfully
Rule 60371
Judge’s Competency as a Witness
Rule 60572
Juror’s Competency as a Witness
Rule 60673

Each abovementioned Rule either requires a predicate for witness
testimony (believing the jury is incapable of seeing the weakness of the
evidence in the absence of the predicate), or excludes evidence due to
concerns that the jury will place too much stock in it. Rules 413 (“Similar
Crimes in Sexual-Assault Cases”), 414 (“Similar Crimes in ChildMolestation Cases”), and 415 (“Similar Acts in Civil Cases Involving
Sexual Assault or Child Molestation”) also fall within this class of Rules
because each Rule exists for the purpose of potentially reversing the
function of Rule 404, in particular cases.74
66. FED. R. EVID. 609.
67. FED. R. EVID. 610.
68. FED. R. EVID. 806.
69. FED. R. EVID. 602–603, 605–606. The requirements that a witness have first-hand
knowledge of the matter to which he or she testifies and take an oath or affirmation to testify
truthfully are the only express competency requirements provided by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. DIX ET AL., supra note 64, § 62, at 305. Rule 602 reflects the common law’s insistence
on the most reliable source of information. FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note; DIX,
supra note 64, § 10, at 47. Rule 603 goes hand-in-hand with the prohibition on inquiry into a
witness’s religious beliefs. See FED. R. EVID. 603 advisory committee’s note. The presiding judge
is deemed not competent to testify because of the concern that a testifying judge cannot “in a jury
trial, avoid conferring his seal of approval on one side in the eyes of the jury.” FED. R. EVID. 605
advisory committee’s note. Similar considerations justify precluding a juror from testifying as a
witness before the other jurors. FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s note.
70. FED. R. EVID. 602.
71. FED. R. EVID. 603.
72. FED. R. EVID. 605.
73. FED. R. EVID. 606.
74. FED. R. EVID. 413–415. Rules 413 through 415 were added as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the largest crime bill in United States history. Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 2135.
In the early 1990s, media attention on perpetrators of sexual crimes escaping convictions on
“technicalities” incited public outrage, which prompted Congress to respond by giving prosecutors
the power to introduce evidence of past sexual crimes. Jeffrey Waller, Comment, Federal Rules of
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Surprisingly, the same concern—that juries will misunderstand, be
confused by, or improperly weigh certain kinds of evidence—animates
the Rules on hearsay and opinion evidence. Hearsay rules75 all codify
the concern that juries will not properly weigh second-hand (or worse)
information.76 Rules on opinion evidence77 all codify the concern that
juries will either be unable to discern fact from opinion or will overweigh,
or unfairly weigh, expert opinions.78

Evidence 413–415: “Laws are Like Medicine; They Generally Cure an Evil by a Lesser . . . Evil”,
30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1503, 1506–07 (1999). The Rules’ supporters in Congress argued that Rule
404’s presumption against such evidence should be reversed in cases involving rape or child
molestation, because the nature of such crimes made such evidence more probative and reliable.
See, e.g. 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (arguing
that the past conduct of a person with a history of sexual crime provides evidence that he or she has
the unique combination of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the commission of such
crimes, and the lack of inhibitions against acting on these impulses).
75. FED. R. EVID. 801–805, 807.
76. See Leubsdorf, supra note 43, at 1227–28, 1249 (discussing the generalizations about
classes of evidence); Posner, supra note 57, at 1530 (discussing the exceptions to the hearsay rule
that allow into evidence the forms of hearsay, or secondhand evidence, that have “probative value
equivalent to that of first-hand evidence”); Justin Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay,
and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 890–93 (2015) (discussing the rational for the rule
barring hearsay); Laurence Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 969 n.42 (1974)
(discussing the triangular analysis of hearsay). The rule against hearsay reflects the concern that
the jury, which, historically, transformed from a group of persons with special knowledge of the
facts to a group with no private information, should receive facts only from persons with first-hand
knowledge of them. 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 802.02 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2014). Thus, the rule and
its exceptions keep from the jury evidence that lacks reliability. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory
committee’s note (noting that the exception “proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate
circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial . . .”).
77. FED. R. EVID. 701–705.
78. See Posner, supra note 57, at 1536 (discussing the dissatisfaction with the use of expert
witnesses). “The basic approach to opinions, law and expert, in these rules is to admit them when
helpful to the trier of fact.” FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note. Rules 703 and 704 allow
experts to testify on matters of which they have no firsthand knowledge, base their testimony on
facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible, and, except in criminal cases, opine on ultimate issues.
In addition, the jury
may view an expert witness as an “objective authority figure more knowledgeable and
credible than the typical lay witness,” and because an expert necessarily testifies about
a subject that is beyond the common knowledge of the jury, the jury is not as well
equipped to question the reliability of the expert’s opinion.
Harvey Brown & Melissa Davis, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses: Fifteen Years Later, 52 HOUS.
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2015) (quoting In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Tex.
2007)); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“When the evidence relates to highly
technical matters and each side has shopped for experts favorable to its position, it is naïve to expect
the jury to be capable of assessing the validity of dramatically opposed testimony.”). The Rules
reflect these considerations in that they require the judge to play the role of a “gatekeeper” of expert
opinion, to ensure that the jury is not presented with unreliable or misleading expert testimony.
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The Rules of Evidence are not explicitly limited in applicability to jury
trials. But one can be comfortable that, nonetheless, the Rules are a
codified view of juror competencies. Courts allude to this very point.79
Scholars report it.80 Reference to this perspective is even made in the
drafting history of the proposed Model Code of Evidence, the predecessor
to the Rules.81
One can also look to whether the same exclusionary rules are present
in administrative courts, which are non-jury adjudications. The set of
exclusionary rules detailed above are not imposed on the administrative
courts. In 1942, the iconic administrative law scholar, Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis, published a piece in the Harvard Law Review that directly
addressed the role of evidence rules in administrative hearings. He
argued that such rules are largely unnecessary, primarily because
administrative hearings are not jury trials.82 Professor Davis did not go
so far as to argue that the Rules excluding hearsay and opinion had no
place in administrative hearings, but did argue that firsthand testimony
should be preferred unless it was deemed “inconvenient.” He also
contended that administrative hearing officers should not place “too
much reliance” on opinion evidence, and administrative courts should
“prefer” sworn instead of unsworn evidence.83

Brown & Davis, supra, at 4. But for purposes of the thesis proposed here—that what counts as a
fact in trials is different from what colloquially is a fact—is inescapably exemplified by Rule 703,
which allows an expert opinion to rely on facts inadmissible as trial evidence.
79. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2234–35 (2012) (“Modern rules of evidence continue
to permit experts to express opinions based on facts about which they lack personal knowledge[;] .
. . . Under both the Illinois and the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may base an opinion on
facts that are ‘made known to the expert at or before the hearing,’ but such reliance does not
constitute admissible evidence of this underlying information. Accordingly, in jury trials, both
Illinois and federal law generally bar an expert from disclosing such inadmissible evidence. In
bench trials, however, both the Illinois and the Federal Rules place no restriction on the revelation
of such information to the fact finder. When the judge sits as the trier of fact, it is presumed that
the judge will understand the limited reason for the disclosure of the underlying inadmissible
information and will not rely on that information for any improper purpose.” (citations omitted)).
80. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50
A.B.A. J. 723, 724 (1964) (discussing the need for reform to evidence law).
81. The report of the ALI Proceedings considering the final draft of the Model Code of Evidence
quoted the Honorable Augustus Hand as saying that he had “taken pride” that he had tried cases
for thirteen years without knowing the technicalities of the rules of evidence. E.M. Morgan,
Discussion of Code of Evidence Proposed Final Draft, in 19 A.L.I. PROC. 74, 225 (1943) (noting
the remarks of Augustus Hand).
82. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 371–74, 416–23 (1942) (discussing the lack of effective laws concerning rules
of evidence and their inapplicability in administrative processes).
83. Id. at 376–77. Accord Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal
Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L. J. 1, 5 (1971) (“Since many of the rules governing the
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Expressed differently, administrative hearing officers should have the
discretion to consider any evidence they want. The Administrative
Procedures Act (first codified four years after Professor Davis’s article)
provides that “[a]ny oral or documentary evidence may be received, but
the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.”84 This is a
codification of the position argued by Professor Davis—that in the
absence of juries, there is no need to exclude weak, but still relevant,
evidence from consideration.85
Finally, one can softly confirm the “derogatory” premise of the Rules
by looking at other countries. Interestingly, countries with no jury trials,
generally, do not exclude hearsay or character evidence.86 Countries with
a crimped scope of a right to a jury trial only exclude such evidence in
the actual jury trials.87
So, one can have some confidence in the assertion that many of the
Rules—and most dramatically all of the hearsay Rules, character
admission of proof in judicial trials are designed to protect the jury from unreliable and possibly
confusing evidence, the rules need not be applied with the same vigor in proceedings solely before
a judge or trial examiner.”).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1990).
85. Gellhorn, supra note 83, at 8.
86. The technical treatments of hearsay and character evidence vary. In most countries without
a jury system, there are simply no rules addressing hearsay or character evidence at all. See Daniel
Pulecio-Boek, The Genealogy of Prosecutorial Discretion in Latin America: A Comparative and
Historical Analysis of the Adversarial Reforms in the Region, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 67,
100–01 (2015) (noting that virtually no Latin American evidence code includes rules regarding
character or hearsay evidence); see generally Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in
Continental Legal Systems, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (1995) (discussing the lack of doctrines
regarding propensity evidence in continental Europe). Other codes express a preference for nonhearsay when it is available, but do not exclude hearsay. See, e.g., STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG
[STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 1319, as
amended, § 250 (Ger.); Decreto No. 189-84, Codigo de Procedimientos Penales [Code of Criminal
Procedure], art. 199 (Hond.). Several countries have rules barring hearsay and/or character
evidence, but the codified exceptions generally give the judge discretion to admit such evidence
and thus swallow up the rule. See, e.g., Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 § 3 (S. Afr.);
The Evidence Act 1967, §§ 34–39 (Tanz.). A handful of countries without jury systems limit
hearsay and character evidence only in criminal trials. See Appendix to this Article (noting the jury
system in other countries). But rules subjecting hearsay and/or character evidence to more scrutiny
in criminal cases are probably “rooted as much in due process values as [they are] in the desire to
project the adjudicator from unreliable information.” MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW
ADRIFT 15 (1997). Accord Stein, supra note 44, at 428 (arguing that many scholars have called for
the “abolition of all admissibility and corroboration rules” of evidence law).
87. England, Scotland, and Jamaica are examples of this. See Appendix to this Article (noting
the jury system in other countries). In the case of South Korea, the advent of the criminal jury in
2008 was accompanied by the introduction of rules excluding hearsay and other unfairly prejudicial
evidence. Ryan Y. Park, The Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons and Insights from Korea, AM. J.
COMP. L. 525, 554 (2010).
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evidence Rules, and Rules on opinion testimony—are grounded in a
derogatory view of juries.88 While this set of Rules intuitively would
seem to impair the accuracy of fact finding at trial, these Rules are an
attempt to increase the likelihood that a trial outcome will correspond to
what actually happened.
4. Evidence Rules Intentionally Compromising the Likelihood of
Accurate Results
Having dealt with procedural and administrative Rules and jurorcapability Rules, what remains is a set of Rules intentionally excluding
relevant evidence on the grounds that it will impair accurate
determinations at trial. In other words, in contrast to hearsay and
character evidence rules, these “exclusion of relevant evidence” Rules are
not attempting to increase the likelihood that a trial outcome will
correspond with what actually happened. Rather, these Rules make the
exact opposite choice—these Rules keep out evidence that does bear on
determining what happened, and they do so on the assumption that, while
such evidence would be helpful, there nonetheless are valid reasons to
ignore it.
The first collection of these Rules is found in Article IV of the Rules.
The Article IV Rules alter the conduct and decisions of persons and/or
entities external to the parties in trial.89 Each of these Rules takes the
same form: assume action “X” is considered a preferred choice, but if
actor A does X, and if B sues A, then A’s trial opponent B might gain an
advantage at trial by showing that A did X. The Article IV Rules, in order
to encourage A to do X, prohibit B from introducing evidence that A did
X at trial.
A concrete illustration is the Rule excluding settlement offers from
evidence.90 People want cases to settle—one does not wish to waste court
resources or client money. We do not want people to hesitate to make
settlement offers for fear that if the case does not settle, then the offer will
be seen as a tacit admission of liability. Therefore, to incentivize people
to make settlement offers, the Rules provide that, generally, a party

88. There is growing empirical evidence that the derogatory view of juries is not supportable.
See, e.g., Sevier, supra note 76, at 890–93, 922–24 (discussing how the hearsay rule has had
significant political and scholarly controversy).
89. Rules 407 through 411 each promote “a socially valuable activity . . . by protecting those
who engage in that activity from evidence that might be used against them.” DEBORAH JONES
MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL RULES TO THE
COURTROOM 88 (3rd ed. 2015).
90. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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cannot argue at trial that their opponent’s offer of settlement is a tacit
admission. Rule 408 and its philosophical siblings are as followed:
Rule Number

Name

Rule 40791
Rule 40892
Rule 40993
Rule 41094
Rule 41195
Rule 41296

Subsequent Remedial Measures
Compromise Offers and Negotiations
Offers to Pay Medical and Similar Expenses
Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements
Liability Insurance
Sex-Offense Cases: The Victim’s Sexual Behavior
or Pre-Dispositions

A related set of doctrines is found in the law of privileges.97 Privileges
recognize certain relationships that society values that might not fully
function except in an environment of trust, confidence, and privacy.98 As
a result, privileges work to keep out of evidence “extremely probative”
and “reliable” information.99 For reasons unrelated to evidence
doctrine,100 the Rules do not codify a comprehensive list of privileges,
but nonetheless recognize the notion of privileges in Rules 501
(“Privilege in General”) and 502 (“Attorney-Client Privilege and WorkProduct; Limitations on Waiver”).101 The privileges currently and
91. FED. R. EVID. 407.
92. FED. R. EVID. 408.
93. FED. R. EVID. 409.
94. FED. R. EVID. 410.
95. FED. R. EVID. 411.
96. FED. R. EVID. 412.
97. See MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 89, at 88 (describing the various privileged
relationships, such as attorney-client, spousal testimony and marital communications,
psychotherapist-patient privilege, executive, clergy-communicant, and privilege against selfincrimination).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 826. Accord DIX, supra note 64, at 264 (“[R]ather than facilitating the illumination
of the truth, [privileges] shut out the light.”); Davis, supra note 82, at 364, 384 (explaining that
privileges “obstruct the search for truth in order to promote certain extrinsic policies”).
100. Congress considered the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence during the “Watergate”
scandals, which soured Congress on codification of privileges. MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note
89, at 289.
101. FED. R. EVID. 501–502. The original proposal by the Advisory Committee had thirteen
privileges, but got caught up in the then broader controversy of Watergate and privilege; Congress
did not adopt the original proposal on privileges. MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 89, at 829.
The proposed Article V submitted to Congress contained thirteen rules: one provided that only
those privileges set forth in Article V or in some other Act of Congress could be recognized by the
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unambiguously recognized in federal courts are the right against selfincrimination, attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product privilege,
spousal-testimonial and spousal-confidences privileges, psychotherapistpatient privilege, executive privilege, and clergy-communicant
privilege.102 There is a recognized, but less defined, state-secrets
privilege,103 and some support for a journalist-source privilege.104 Some
states also recognize a physician-patient privilege and an intra-family
privilege beyond spouses.105 Each of these privileges represents a choice
that evidence in a particular dispute will be excluded to affect the choices
made by persons external to the dispute (the generic set of future clients,
spouses, patients, journalist sources, penitents, etc.).106
A third set of exclusions of relevant evidence for nonaccuracy reasons
are procedural exclusions. In these instances—such as exclusion of
improperly gathered evidence in criminal cases107 and exclusion due to
discovery abuse in civil cases108—evidence is excluded not because the
federal courts, nine defined specific privileges, and three addressed issues of waiver. Rules of
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230–61 (1972) (Proposed Rules
501–513). The Judiciary Committee amended Article V, eliminating all of the specific rules on
privilege in favor of Rule 501, which provides that privilege is governed by the common law, the
United States Constitution, federal law, and rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. The rationale
underlying the amendment was that federal law should not supersede state law in substantive areas
such as privilege absent a compelling reason. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8–9 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082–83. Some scholars suggest that the original proposal by the
Advisory Committee got caught up in the then broader controversy of Watergate and privilege.
MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 89, at 829. In 2008, the Advisory Committee proposed and
Congress enacted Rule 502, which provides for limitations on waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and work product protection, in response to longstanding disputes in the courts about the
effect of certain disclosures of protected information and complaints about prohibitively high
litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.
102. MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 89, at 830–31.
103. See generally Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2006–2007) (giving a general overview of the state secrets privilege).
104. MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 89, at 831–32.
105. Id. at 832.
106. Posner, supra note 57, at 1530–32.
107. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need to Learn)
About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests,
1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983) (arguing the “costs” of the exclusionary rule are lower
than reported); Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical
Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585 (1983) (examining societal costs from lost
prosecutions that result from this exclusionary rule).
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (“If a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent
. . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the court where the action is pending
may issue further just orders. They may include the following: (i) directing that the matters
embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action,
as the prevailing party claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence . . . .”).
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admission of the evidence might distort the chances of reaching an
accurate result, but rather despite the possibility that the exclusion might
do so; the decision is made that, because of the way the police
(mis)behaved, or because of the way the lawyer (mis)behaved, the Rules
must incentivize better behavior in the future, even if the cost is the
distorted outcome of the trial at hand.109
Finally, there is the exclusion of evidence for reasons of time and
money.110 Here, both Rules 403 and 611 allow the exclusion of relevant
evidence when it is too time consuming or repetitive.111
As with jury derogation evidence Rules, excluding concededly
relevant evidence for reasons unrelated to and independent of increasing
the accuracy of trial fact finding is a counterintuitive definition of what
counts as a fact in courts. And so, as a check that one is not too
precipitously interpreting what American courts are doing, one can again
look for at least soft confirmation from the courts of other countries. One
can ask: Do other countries also recognize privileges and the like, thereby
excluding concededly relevant evidence? And when one does so, the
hypothesis again is confirmed: countries around the world routinely and
intentionally exclude from evidence information that would advance the
likelihood that a trial outcome will correspond with what actually
happened.112 Essentially, globally, courts are comfortable occasionally
109. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (“[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule
‘is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”’ (internal citations omitted)).
110. FED. R. EVID. 403, 622.
111. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: . . . undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”); FED. R. EVID. 611 (“The court should
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting
evidence so as to . . . avoid wasting time.”).
112. Evidentiary privileges are examples of “[r]ules rejecting probative information for the sake
of values unrelated to the pursuit of truth.” MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 12–13
(1997) (noting that testimonial privileges are widespread in continental Europe and often broader
than the common law privileges). Some form of the attorney-client privilege exists in nearly every
country examined in Appendix A of this Article. See, e.g., CODE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [C. CRIM.
PROC.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 159(b), (Fletorja zyrtate Nos. 5–7 1995) (Alb.); CODE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [C. CRIM. PROC.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 65(4) (Arm.);
Commonwealth, Evidence Act 1995 s 118–19 (Austl.); CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN.] [CRIMINAL
CODE] §§ 246–247 (Chile); Civil Procedure Act, Act No. 9171, Dec. 26 2008, art. 315, (S. Kor.);
RÄTTGÅNGSBALKEN [RB] [CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE], 36:3 (Swed.); The Evidence Act
1967, §§134–137 (Tanz.); CEZA MUHAKEMESI KANUNU [CMUK.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE]
art. 46 (Turk.); Civil Evidence Act, (Act No. 15/1999) § 8 (Zim.). The spousal/familial privileges
is just as widespread. E.g., Code CIVIL PROCEDURE [C. CIV. PROC.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE]art.
566, (Fletorja zyrtare Nos. 9–11 1996) (Alb.); CODE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [C. CRIM. PROC.]
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 158, (Fletorja zyrtate Nos. 5–7 1995) (Alb.); CODE CRIMINAL
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subjugating trial accuracy to other values. They do not see this as
inconsistent with the public courts’ role.
5. Conclusions About What Courts Count as Facts
What now can one conclude about what counts as a fact? Relevant
evidence counts as a fact, subject to two limitations. First, a relevant fact
must be within the evaluative skill set of preconceived notions of juror
competence. Second, a relevant fact must not promote a defined set of
undesirable behaviors external to the trial.
As Judge Richard Posner cautions, “it is important to note that the
formal rules only codify a fraction of the law of evidence.”113 But the
other evidence rules Judge Posner has in mind—such as res ipsa
loquitur—are not matters of defining facts, but rather are ways to resolve
disputes by approaches other than the gathering of facts.114 These other
rules are, at most, tangential to the ideas of this Article.
So, what one can learn from better understanding justification in
courts, or what counts as a fact, is that correct outcomes are not the end
all and be all of public courts. Put another way, justification in courts
means that the relevant facts are both within the evaluative skills of
jurors’ competence and do not promote defined undesirable behaviors
external to the trial.
Finally, it bears at least brief acknowledgement and discussion that if
one departs from the concrete settings of courtrooms and returns to the
theoretical context of epistemology, then defining justification as
dependent on external assumptions is philosophically problematic.
Applying nuanced philosophical terminology somewhat crudely, the
Rules are an example of an inferential justification that is an epistemic
regression: knowledge formed from justified belief inferred from other
PROCEDURE [C. CRIM. PROC.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 20(1) (Arm.);
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT 3202, as amended, § 383(1)–(3) (Ger.); Civil Procedure Act, Act No. 9171,
Dec. 26 2008, art. 314, (S. Kor.); RÄTTGÅNGSBALKEN [RB] [CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE],
36:3 (Swed.); The Evidence Act 1967, §§ 130–131 (Tanz.); CEZA MUHAKEMESI KANUNU
[CMUK.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 45 (Turk.); Civil Evidence Act, (Act No. 15/1999) §
6 (Zim.). In South Africa, judges have “wide discretion to permit [a witness] to refuse to disclose
information where disclosure would be a breach of some ethical or social value and nondisclosure
would be unlikely to result in serious injustice in the particular case in which it is claimed.” L. H.
HOFFMAN & D. T. ZEFFERT, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 267 (4th ed. 1988). But see
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Exclusionary Rule As a Symbol of the Rule of Law, 67 SMU L. REV.
821, 822–29 (2014) (reporting on the spread of the criminal exclusionary rule internationally in
new democracies as a check on government abuse and a symbol of democracy).
113. Posner, supra note 57, at 1477, 1517.
114. Id.
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knowledge formed from justified belief.115 The Rules avoid the absurdity
of an infinite epistemic regression by providing a foundation for this
otherwise bottomless inquiry—the Rules define a set of information that
a fact finder, by fiat, is empowered to believe as true, and thus is justified
in inferring knowledge from this information.
But in doing so, the Rules create their own absurdity, because the
foundation is defined as incomplete (because relevant evidence is
excluded) and hence inaccurate. The Rules define a path to truth that
intentionally is not the whole truth. This argument, in its most abstract
form, is the basis of skepticism in philosophy of “foundationalism” and
explanations of “justification.”116
That is a mouthful. For purposes of understanding justification in
courts, the problem can be stated more accessibly: the Rules have to make
assumptions about what could be true to evaluate what is true. That is
epistemologically problematic. But in the more concrete context of
justification in courts, this issue is less problematic in part due to the
insight that correct trial judgments are not the only concern of the courts.
C. Understanding Knowledge in Courts
This Article previously defined knowledge as an intuitive form of
certainty.117 In other words, it is when one has collected a sufficient
quantum and quality of information that one feels comfortable ending the
information-gathering function and is willing to now act.
Proceeding to trial is an information-gathering, decision-making
endeavor. Any information-gathering, decision-making endeavor has
rules for the quality of information it is willing to consider, and for the
115. See Fumerton, supra note 31 (“[T]he vast majority of the propositions we know or
justifiably believe have that status only because we know or justifiably believe other different
propositions.”).
116. Accord id. (“If all justification were inferential then for someone S to be justified in
believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other
proposition E1. But E1 could justify S in believing P only if S were justified in believing E1, and
if all justification were inferential the only way for S to do that would be to infer it from some other
proposition justifiably believed, E2, a proposition which in turn would have to be inferred from
some other proposition E3 which is justifiably believed, and so on, ad infinitum. But finite beings
cannot complete an infinitely long chain of reasoning and so if all justification were inferential noone would be justified in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever. This most radical of
all skepticisms is absurd (it entails that one couldn’t even be justified in believing it) and so there
must be a kind of justification which is not inferential, i.e., there must be noninferentially justified
beliefs which terminate regresses of justification.”). This is the coherentist attack on
foundationalist theories of justification. See LEHRER, supra note 21, at 15–18 (discussing the
coherence theory and foundationalist theory and how the two interact).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28 (discussing “knowledge” as an intuitive form of
certainty).
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quantum of information collected such that collection can end and action
can begin.
Consider, for example, the different approaches of a research physician
and a treating physician. A research physician—or, for that matter, any
bench scientist in any hard science discipline—primarily attempts to
advance pure knowledge; it is paramount that a scientist designs an
experiment rigorously.118 Thus, a research scientist considers data that
can be derived from a properly structured, double-blind experiment. A
research scientist acts—meaning the scientist is willing to move on to the
next task—only if the result can be replicated.
On the other hand, a treating physician, in response to the necessity of
addressing patient health, has very different notions of what to consider
as a basis to act, and when to act. Data worthy of consideration is any
symptom, regardless of its vagueness, source, or likelihood. The
decision-making metric is the “differential diagnosis,”119 under which the
physician may treat a more dangerous, albeit less probable, explanation
first.120
Thought of this way, knowledge in courts—or the acceptable degree
of probability—is a determination regarding the primacy of accuracy.
1. Knowledge as Accuracy
At the 2015 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools (“AALS”), the Criminal Justice Section presented a
distinguished panel addressing the ways in which the criminal justice
system fell short of being just or fair because of the system’s apparently
insufficient devotion to discerning the truth with accuracy.121 An
underlying assumption of the entire panel was that guilt or innocence, at
least in a serious criminal case, could—and should—be determined
118. Accord John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541,
541–42 (1978) (arguing objective truth is best suited to scientific inquiries, while courts are better
suited to distributive justice).
119. Differential diagnosis, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE (2008).
120. Louis Kaplow uses the example of a treating doctor to rhetorically demonstrate why legal
systems pay too little attention to decisional rules—he argues that in important medical decisions
we would never use a preponderance of evidence standard. See Kaplow, supra note 38, at 738, 745
(explaining that the inference is that in medical decisions—where the stakes often can be higher
than in civil litigation—the decisional rule would have to be more stringent. Under the differential
diagnosis approach, however, the initial treatment may be addressing something even less likely
than 50/50. And that is the point—different systems have different decision rules in response to
different system needs).
121. Criminal Justice — Reprioritizing Accuracy As The Primary Goal Of The Criminal Justice
System, AALS 2015 Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2015), https://soundcloud.com/aals-2/criminaljustice-reprioritizing-accuracy-as-the-primary-goal-of-the-criminal-justice-system/s-YH7ve.
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accurately no matter the procedural burden or the stage of the
litigation.122
The panelists all conceded that whatever they thought should be the
primacy of accuracy, the United States Supreme Court unambiguously
has promoted finality over accuracy.123 Put simply, the jurisprudence of
the Court plainly holds that if a trial has been procedurally sufficient, the
fact that the verdict could be more accurate is not a reason to reopen the
matter. Or phrased another way, even those who believe accuracy is
attainable concede that the courts do not adopt this as a primary value.
The moderator of the AALS Panel, Professor Dan Simon, has written
in detail on the value of accuracy in American courts.124 In his book,
Professor Simon puzzles over the Supreme Court jurisprudence: “One of
the most bewildering and underappreciated features of the criminal
justice process is the low value it assigns to the accuracy of its factual
determinations or, in the legal parlance, to the discovery of truth.”125 As
Professor Simon details, the system regularly allows process to trump
accuracy.
It is one thing to disagree with the Court. It is quite another to find it
“bewildering.” If the Court’s opinions on accuracy are “bewildering,”
then it bears revisiting whether the Court and Professor Simon mean the
same thing by accuracy.
A quantum of information rule is the balancing point a system sets
between its competing values of finality and certainty. As discussed
supra, any information-gathering, decision-making endeavor has a set of
rules for the quantum of information necessary to act.126 This is the
meaning of accuracy within an information-gathering, decision-making
endeavor. It is what Professor Luke Meier describes as a “confidence
principle:” the confidence one has in the probability of an event occurring
is predictive of whether the event actually occurred.127
Because absolute certainty is not attainable, the endeavor must, at
some point, conclude that it is “accurate enough,” colloquially speaking,
before acting.128 A complaint about the accuracy of an information122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See generally DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS (2012) (discussing how much emphasis courts place on accurate information).
125. Id. at 209.
126. See supra Part I.C (discussing knowledge in the courts).
127. See Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the “Reasonable Jury” Standard, 84 MISS. L.J.
747, 778–813 (2014–2015) (discussing the “confidence principle” through various hypotheticals).
128. Accord McCauliff, supra note 37, at 1295–96 (explaining because the trier of fact cannot
know if a fact is true, he or she can only be persuaded to the degree required by the burden of
proof).
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seeking endeavor is a complaint that the system has not set the threshold
for “accurate enough.” This threshold appears at the juncture that
represents the end of information gathering and the start of action. Thus,
the decisional rule—the rule for when gathering data can end and action
can begin—defines a system’s value of accuracy.
2. Accuracy as Burdens of Proof
In the American courts, the rules describing the necessary production
of a quantum of accurate information are the burden of production rules,
which are one of two concepts incorporated within the familiar and
broader burden of proof rules that are used as decisional rules: generally
preponderance of the evidence in a civil case, and beyond a reasonable
doubt in a criminal case.129 Burdens of proof set a metric both for the
acceptable probability that a decision will be correct, and how to make
that decision (and avoid a “tie”).
The American courts are a binomial-decision system.130 In a civil case
over a claim between a pair of parties, a verdict can only be liable or not
liable. In a criminal case, as to each charge against each defendant, a
verdict can only be guilty or not guilty. American courts reach decisions
almost every time.131 But even in a binomial-decision system, it is
possible that a decision is not reached; rather, there is a tie. Thus, this
Part examines tie-breaking rules in binomial-decision systems.
129. See, e.g., id. at 1293–94 (discussing burdens of proof as various degrees of belief in the
mind). If one probes more deeply than the general contexts of most civil cases and most criminal
cases, there are other burdens of proof. Allen, supra note 2, at 557, 558–59. For purposes of this
Article, these nuances do not matter. Further, the argument that some burdens of proof are
constitutionally required, as discussed by Alex Stein, does not matter to this Article. Alex Stein,
Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 79–82 (2008).
130. Not all court systems are binomial decision systems. For example, a verdict in a criminal
trial in Scotland gives three options: guilty, not guilty, and not proven. See Lorraine Hope et al., A
Third Verdict Option: Exploring the Option of the Not Proven Verdict on Mock Juror Decision
Making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 242 (2008) (discussing the not proven verdict). See
generally Samuel Bray, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1299 (2005)
(explaining the not proven verdict).
131. Hung jury rates in the United States are approximately 5 percent to 7 percent. George C.
Thomas, III & Mark Greenbaum, Justice Story Cuts the Gordian Knot of Hung Jury Instructions,
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 893, 918 (2006–2007). See also Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone:
Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection of the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 569,
582–83 (2006–2007) (revealing roughly 2 percent of federal trials and 4–6 percent of state trials
end in hung juries). See generally HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56
(1966) (discussing the American jury system and hung juries); G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, Executive Summary to HUNG JURIES: ARE THEY A PROBLEM?,
http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/what-wedo/~/media/microsites/files/cjs/jury%20news/hung%20juries%20are%20they%20a%20problem.a
shx (discussing the NCSC study on hung juries in America).
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While a true tie might be so unlikely as to essentially be impossible, if
one defines a tie simply as a close question—one where the right decision
is not yet sufficiently determinable—then how a system deals with ties is
important.
Defining ties this way is not a matter of convenience, but rather of
reality. Trials have never been, and never will be “Bayesian”132—judges
and juries do not seek to quantify experiential data and risk of error to
mathematically determine a verdict. The rules of courts structure a
system that allows judges and juries to decide what probably happened
in a case, and to be confident enough with that conclusion that a dispute
can come to an end.133 Until that point is reached, the trial is in stasis—
it is a tie. Thus, the trial rules for when to move to a verdict represent the
rules for when trials reach “knowledge.”
Now, one can comfortably see how the American courts act like any
other information-gathering endeavor. Ties create a decision point: the
point at which reaching the right decision is less important than reaching
some decision. In information-gathering endeavors, as information is
gathered there will be junctures where a decision is not yet considered
readily determinable. Some of these junctures are simply moments where
information gathering is early and incomplete. Others are junctures
where the system has gathered enough information that a decision could
be made. In these later instances, the system rules either will impose a
decisional rule—a tie-breaking rule governing how to make a decision—
or continue with the information-gathering process.134
In this way, decisions in trials (verdicts and judgments) are different
from decisions described in classical studies of decision making (such as

132. Bayes Theorem is “a theorem expressing the probability of one of a number of mutually
exclusive events Hi, given some other event E, in terms of the probabilities of all the Hi
independently of E and the probabilities of E given each Hi.” Bayes Theorem, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/241646?redirectedFrom=Bayes+Theorem#eid12688130
(last
visited Sept. 18, 2016).
133. See Meier, supra note 39, at 2 (“Stated simply, the probability inquiry requires an estimate
as to the likelihood of a given fact being true; the confidence inquiry asks how sure one can be
about a probability estimate given the information available.”). See also Neil B. Cohen, Confidence
in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385,
395–97 (1985) (explaining why past efforts to have an accurate probabilistic approach to burdens
of persuasion in court have failed).
134. See Michael Block & Jeffrey S. Parker, Decision Making in the Absence of Successful Fact
Finding: Theory and Experimental Evidence on Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Systems of
Adjudication, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 89, 91 (2004) (noting that “burdens of proof . . . operate
as default rules of decision for cases where revelation has failed”). A variant of this later version
of a tie is when there is no further information to be gathered.
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an economist using economic theory to analyze maximally efficient
decision making). In trials, the decision maker (judge or jury) is different
from the system participants controlling the quantum of information upon
which the decision will be based (attorneys and litigants). Classic
decision theory assumes decision making where the decision maker and
the information gatherer are the same person/entity.135
Subject to this distinction, burdens of proof as decisional rules are not
only probability rules, but also tie-breaking rules.136 In trials, the
attorneys—subject to the gatekeeping rulings of the judge—control the
quantum of information.137 Burdens of proof then regulate the way the
decision maker manipulates this information. The decision maker does
not usually—indeed, rarely can—send the case back to the lawyers and
say, essentially, “I need to know more.”
The function of burdens of proof in trials is to force a decision, or to
probabilistically take the possibility of a true tie off the table. It is a
message to the parties: “Put into evidence whatever information you
wish, but this is it; this dispute ends today.” So in trials the mere fact of
imposing a tie-breaking rule imprecisely notes that, in the instance of
close questions, at some point the system values finality more than the
system fears error.138 But the Rules do not quantify when information
gathering will end, because it is in the control of the parties, not of the
decision maker. Rather, the Rules provide that when information
gathering has ended, the decision maker must decide.
Burdens of proof also teach something about courts’ views toward
particular kinds of error. Errors can be one of two types: Type I error is
a false positive; Type II error is a false negative. Binomial-decision

135. Timothy Williamson argues that in the strictest construction, one “cannot use decision
theory as a guide to evidential probability.” TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS
210 (2000). See Kaplow, supra note 38, at 738 (exploring a more detailed economic analysis of
this phenomena and its implications). See generally Hillel J. Einhorn & Robert M. Hogarth,
Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of Judgment and Choice, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 53
(1981) (discussing how humans make decisions).
136. See Jerome A. Hoffman & William A. Schroeder, Burdens of Proof, 38 ALA. L. REV. 31,
31 (1986–1987) (explaining burdens of proof in a trial do more than merely inform decisions).
137. See Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and
Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
212, 212–13 (2014) (describing an adversarial system—in contrast to an inquisitorial system—
which places control of information outside the control of the decision maker and may be more
poorly equipped to achieve objective accuracy).
138. A compelling criticism of the balance the American courts have struck between finality
and accuracy can be found at Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of PostConviction Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CALIF. L. REV. 545, 547, 550, 552, 573,
582 (2014).
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systems—in setting their decisional rules—express a choice between: (1)
neutrality between Type I error and Type II error; and (2) preferring one
type of error to the other.139
An example of near neutrality between Type I error and Type II error
comes from baseball. Under the arguably apocryphal version of the rules
of baseball, when a first baseman catches the ball at the apparent same
moment that the runner’s foot touches the base, the tie goes to the
runner.140 The likelihood is essentially zero that, if measured even in
microseconds, there was an actual tie. If one assumes that instances of
the runner beating the catch and instances of the catch beating the runner
are equally distributed along a spectrum of which came first and by how
much, then to impose a tie-breaking rule at exactly the point of the
apparently true tie means baseball approaches the two types of error
almost neutrally.141 Baseball is as close as possible—while still making
a decision—to being indifferent between a mistaken safe call and
mistaken out call.
An example of a system that does not view both types of error neutrally
is a pregnancy test. No over-the-counter pregnancy test is perfect. It is
capable of giving a false positive or a false negative. But “[f]alse-positive
results are not thought to be as significant a public health concern as falsenegative results, as they should lead to a prenatal appointment and followup laboratory testing.”142 For these reasons, a pregnancy test is
intentionally biased to produce more false positives than false negatives.
As these examples illustrate, the nature of the tie-breaking rule of a
system teaches us about that system’s view toward particular types of
error.143 And, with this in mind, one can see something important about

139. See Kaplow, supra note 120, at 738 (discussing the desire of courts to want both types of
errors adjudicated because although Type I errors do not impose higher costs than Type II in civil
cases, they do in criminal cases).
140. See
generally
Tie
Goes
to
the
Runner,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tie_goes_to_the_runner (last visited Aug. 26, 2016). I am aware that
as video technology has advanced and as Major League Baseball has adopted video review, the
likelihood and frequency of a true tie has almost been eliminated entirely. But the utility of baseball
as an example serves the purposes of this Article, and it bears noting that there are vastly more
baseball games played outside of Major League Baseball than within it.
141. Baseball does not approach the two types of error exactly neutrally, as that would require
either randomizing the beneficiary of a true tie or doing something like the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (“NCAA”) basketball does when two opposing team players simultaneously
possess the ball—in the run of the game the two teams alternate the right to possession in the wake
of a tie. But for purposes of this Article, baseball remains sufficiently illustrative.
142. Lori A. Bastian et al., Diagnostic Efficiency of Home Pregnancy Test Kits, 7 ARCHIVES
FAM. MED. 5, 465–69 (1998).
143. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 844–49 (Wolters
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the American courts. The civil trial decisional rule—preponderance of
the evidence—is like the baseball example (i.e., a near neutral rule).144
In civil cases, the system essentially is indifferent to who wins.145 The
criminal trial decisional rule—beyond a reasonable doubt—is like the
pregnancy tests (i.e., a strong preference rule). But a criminal trial, in
contrast to a pregnancy test, prefers Type II error (a not guilty verdict
setting a guilty person free) rather than Type I error (a guilty verdict
convicting an innocent accused).146
One more observation can tentatively be made about burdens of proof.

Kluwer Law & Business, 9th ed. 2014) (discussing various legal economic perspectives with a
specific focus on burden of proof rules and errors).
144. While L. Jonathan Cohen does so in the course of developing a different point, in his work
addressing burdens of proof, he posits an example of a case where the only evidence of who was a
gatecrasher is that of 1000 attendees to a rodeo, only 499 paid to get in; his example illustrates the
neutrality of the civil system between the two types of error—as to any particular person accused
of being a gatecrasher, the likelihood of Type I error is .501 and the likelihood of Type II error is
.499, yet the system is comfortable reaching a decision. L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE
AND THE PROVABLE 74–78 (1977). The civil justice system is not uniformly neutral between Type
I and Type II error. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996) (balancing Type I against Type II
error in securities litigation). Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence arguably broadly changes the
balance point in civil cases between Type I and Type II error by empowering a civil trial judge to
dismiss a case pre-discovery as a means of reducing the incidence of frivolous litigation. Mark
Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010) (arguing that there is a higher risk of frivolous lawsuits when
the plaintiff is favored in cost-disparity); James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Plausible Denial:
Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 141, 146–47, 151–53 (2009)
(citing a debate regarding the pleading rules after Iqbal and Twonmbly); Samuel Issacharoff &
Geoffrey Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 437 (2013) (using cost shifting to create incentives for parties to either acquire or reveal
information pertinent to a motion to dismiss); Kenneth S. Klein, Removing the Blindfold and
Tipping the Scales: The Unintended Lesson of Ashcroft v. Iqbal Is That Frivolous Lawsuits May
Be Important to Our Nation, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 593 (2010) (curbing frivolous lawsuits may
undermine the core value of neutrality in justice). Because the Supreme Court did not discuss its
rationale in the jargon of Type I and Type II error, the Court’s holdings are susceptible of at least
two interpretations: the Court may be determining that the civil system no longer should be strictly
neutral, but the Court also simply may be trying to correct for a system that should be neutral but
that the Court believes has become out of balance.
145. Kaplow, supra note 120, at 742–44.
146. Id. at 744 n.10; Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 308 (2007). In other words, the criminal justice system is premised
on a decision that as a society we are willing to live with more criminals on the street to minimize
the instances of incarceration of the innocent. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970)
(the reasonable doubt standard is “a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting
on factual error”). The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is one place we can concretely see
this decision in action. Cf. Matteo Rizzoli & Luca Stanca, Judicial Error and Crime Deterrence:
Theory and Experimental Evidence, 55 J. L. & ECON. 311, 311, 316 (2012) (arguing that in criminal
justice Type I error and Type II error might have an equal deterrence effect).
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The intention of burdens may not be matched by the reality. As noted,
the civil burden of proof is neutral between types of error. The criminal
burden of proof is a strong preference rule. So, if the criminal burden of
proof functions as intended, then in the set of not guilty verdicts, people
would expect that a high percentage of acquittals are actually juries that
conclude “not proven,” rather than “exoneration.”
But there is some weak data suggesting this is not what actually occurs.
In Scotland, for example, the criminal verdict form has had three options
for over 300 years: “Guilty,” “Not Guilty,” and “Not Proven.”147 The
verdict choice of Not Proven accounts for between one-fifth and one-third
of all Scottish acquittals.148 While a variety of factors could explain this
experience, one explanation is that between 66 percent and 80 percent of
acquittals in Scotland are actual exonerations.149 And while Scotland is
not the United States, and the differences systemically and culturally
might matter for comparative purposes, Scotland’s experience is at least
tentative evidence and raises a question as to how well the American
burdens are achieving their architectural purpose.
This tentative conclusion reinforces an earlier point: trial judgments do
not mirror precisely, either in structure or behavior, the kinds of decisions
modeled in decision theory. It turns out that decision theory is a useful
analog to what happens in trials, but is not a description of what happens
in trials. And for this reason, one can draw broad, but not mathematically
precise, conclusions about the role of burdens of proof in trials. Those
147. See Lorraine Hope et al., A Third Verdict Option: Exploring the Option of the Not Proven
Verdict on Mock Juror Decision Making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 242 (2008) (noting the
Scottish legal system allows for an option of “not proven,” where the defendant is culpable, but the
prosecution has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt).
148. Id.
149. I believe the true exoneration rate in Scotland is actually between somewhat and far lower
that this rate. Here is why: envision a spectrum of confidence of guilt ranging from 0 percent
certainty of guilt (100 percent certainty of innocence) to 100 percent certainty of guilt. We will
somewhat arbitrarily, for these purposes, assign a value of 90 percent of certainty guilt to “guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt”—the standard for conviction in a criminal trial. “Probably guilty”
versus “probably innocent” would break right at 50 percent. So on this spectrum, “Guilty” would
be the cases from 90 percent to 100 percent. “Probably Not Guilty” would be the cases from 0
percent to 50 percent. “Probably Guilty but Not Proven” would be the cases from 50 percent to 90
percent. This model would predict, then, that four-ninths of acquittals—44.44 percent—would be
where the jury is actually concluding “Probably Guilty but Not Proven.” But Scotland’s experience
is that the percentage of acquittals through a verdict of “Not Proven” is 20 percent to 33.33 percent.
There are a variety of factors that could explain why juries in Scotland opt for a finding of “Not
Proven.” See generally id. But all of these factors would vector toward the “Not Proven” rate
being higher—not lower—than the incidence of a true conclusion of “Not Proven.” So I conclude
that the true rate of acquittals because guilt was “Not Proven” “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” is
higher than 20 percent to 33.33 percent, and conversely the true exoneration rate is lower than 66.67
percent to 80 percent of all acquittals.
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conclusions are that the rules of the American courts: (1) express a
preference for finality over accuracy; (2) express a near neutral view of
error in civil cases; and (3) express a strong preference for Type II error
in criminal cases.150
It bears noting that some expert scholars, in their economic analysis of
the law, reject the notion that mathematically precise conclusions about
the role of burdens of proof in trials are unattainable. There is a lot of
contemporary discussion in the legal literature—largely taking a
Bayesian approach151—about refining burdens of proof either to function
optimally or to serve system goals beyond simply being a decisional rule.
Professors Bruce Hay and Kathryn Spier argue for burdens of proof as a
means of limiting the costs of resolving a dispute.152 Professor Louis
Kaplow proposes modifying burdens of proof to better reflect statistical
distributions of harms and benefits related to kinds of behavior.153
Professor Edward Cheng calls for a pure (or at least more) numerical
approach to burdens of proof as decisional rules.154 Professors Ronald
Allen and Alex Stein take on the economic analysis of Professor Kaplow
and Professor Cheng, and use an economic analysis to conclude burdens
of proof need no great revision.155 Judge Richard Posner argues for
reforms to burdens of proof to simultaneously maximize efficiency and
protect noneconomic interests.156
The underlying assumption of all this scholarship is that it is possible
to define burdens of proof with some mathematical precision. Perhaps
so. But even if burdens of proof can, within academic literature, be
defined with mathematical precision, it is doubtful that it is within the
capabilities of most judges and juries to apply them in that manner.157
150. I will not attempt to be any more precise in my description of the role of burdens of proof
in fact finding. I agree with Ronald Allen and Alex Stein that it is impossible to assign anything
like mathematical precision to the nature of fact finding. See Allen & Stein, supra note 2, at 600–
02. But see Stein, supra note 44, at 423 (arguably presenting the opposite conclusion—that fact
finding can be precisely economically modeled).
151. See, e.g., Anne W. Martin & David A. Schum, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A Likelihood
Ration Approach, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 384–85 (1986–1987) (noting how it is possible to
quantify a burden of proof standard).
152. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic
Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 413 (1997).
153. Kaplow, supra note 120, at 751.
154. See generally Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J.
1254 (2013) (arguing that the absolute standardization of the burden of proof is incorrect).
155. Allen & Stein, supra note 2, at 557.
156. Posner, supra note 57, at 1502–07, 1543.
157. Because of constitutional concerns, the majority of all trials carry a right to trial by jury.
Without regard to one’s evaluation of the capabilities of the “average” judge, surely no one would
argue that the “average” juror would or could satisfactorily apply a statistical or mathematical
construct of burdens of proof.
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3. Conclusions About Knowledge in Courts
If accuracy in courts means something different than reaching a result
that is verifiably “correct,” then what do courts mean by accuracy?
Accuracy is an application of a confidence principle; it means that a
quantum of evidence has been gathered sufficient to conclude that a
probably correct determination of what happened can be reached. And
this then gives us a better understanding of knowledge in courts.
Knowledge in courts is reaching a “correct enough” resolution, biasing
toward certainty when the stakes involve liberty and staying near neutral
when the stakes are private relationships.
D. Understanding Belief in Courts
Belief is defined in an information-gathering, decision-making system
as the point at which the system has concluded that it has made not just
any determination, but rather a determination that advances the goals of
the system. So to better understand belief in courts, one must understand
why we have a publicly funded justice system.158
1. Substantive Fairness and Procedural Sufficiency
Why do public courts exist? Why are people willing to devote
enormous amounts of public time and money to resolving who started a
fight, or who caused an automobile accident?
It might seem tautological that the goal of a justice system is, as the
name of the system states, justice. An inscription on the walls of the
United States Department of Justice states: “The United States wins its
point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.”159 But in the
context of law, the word “justice” is imprecise. Justice can refer to one
of two ideas: substantive fairness and procedural sufficiency.
Substantive fairness is an independently equitable result, one that
meets a community’s sense of right and wrong.160 It is, like the weak
158. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 120, at 738 (applying a similar sort of analytical approach—
considering the “why”—by proposing that how to set a burden of proof and evidence threshold
should account for a variety of societal and system interests, including considering the cost of error
in fact finding). See also HART, supra note 34, at 1–17 (noting that the question, “what is law,”
should be answered by considering what concerns motivated the inquiry).
159. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
160. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press ed., 10th ed. 1980).
Rawlsian justice is, of course, but one formulation in a long philosophical dialogue—paralleling
that of “what is truth?”—about “what is justice?” For our purposes, it is suffice to say that Rawls’
view is one seeking to define, and thus provide an example of, a construct of what is an objectively
fair outcome. The jurist Roscoe Pound saw this idea of justice—substantive fairness—as precisely
the goal of the American courts. See Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, THE MID-WEST Q.
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deflationist understanding of truth, a singular matter (i.e., property)
external to any particular dispute, and which a trial either has or does
not.161
Procedural sufficiency is the fair opportunity to present one’s position
to a neutral decision maker.162 It is what the Supreme Court has held is
procedurally guaranteed by the due process clauses of the United States
Constitution.163
Substantive fairness and procedural sufficiency, both broad notions of
justice that comfortably fit within a definition of the word, describe
different ideas of justice.164 Yet while the nature of justice is an ongoing
and intractable philosophical and jurisprudential debate, it is not a matter
of doctrinal ambiguity in the American courts. The architecture of the
justice system reinforces, at innumerable junctures, that the systemic goal
is procedural sufficiency, which pejoratively means something akin to
“fair enough.”165
Examples of “justice only requires ‘fair enough’” are easy to list. Civil

223, 223–35 (1913–1918) (noting how shifts in cultural attitudes define what is right and wrong).
Cf. Allen Buchanan & Deborah Mathieu, Philosophy and Justice, in JUSTICE: VIEWS FROM THE
SOCIAL SCIENCE 11, 11 (Ronald L. Cohen ed., 1986) (“Justice is usually said to exist when a person
receives that to which he or she is entitled . . . .”).
161. But see Thibaut & Walker, supra note 118, at 541–42 (arguing that objective truth is best
suited to scientific inquiries, while courts are better suited to distributive justice).
162. A detailed discussion of the nature of procedural sufficiency as an articulation of justice
can be found in the work of Professor Tom Tyler. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural
Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 103, 107 (1988); see generally Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model
of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
747 (2003) (testing the four-component model of procedural justice through hypothesis
surrounding rules and fairness); Yuen J. Huo et. al., Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in
the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767, 767, 769,
771, 775, 779 (1997). Accord LITA FURBY, PSYCHOLOGY AND JUSTICE, JUSTICE at 163–64
(Ronald L. Cohen ed., Plenum Press 1986) (“[P]erceived fairness of procedures affects satisfaction
with those procedures, independent of outcomes.”).
163. U.S. CONST. amend V; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (holding that the procedures in place were sufficient to satisfy due
process).
164. In August of 2014, one of the dominant news stories in the United States was the civil
unrest in Ferguson, Missouri after a white police officer shot and killed an apparently unarmed
African American, Michael Brown, who witnesses claimed had his hands up at the moment of the
shooting. On CNN, the mother of Michael Brown was asked: “What is justice to you?” She
answered: “Being fair. Arresting this man and making him accountable for his actions.” CNN
Newsroom with Carol Costello (CNN television broadcast Aug. 18, 2014). That seems to be in a
single answer an allusion to the two different concepts of judicial justice.
165. Cf. Haack, supra note 38, at 50–51 (discussing how courts seek an answer that is “tolerably
good”).
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trials do not require unanimous verdicts.166 Criminal trials can have as
few as six jurors.167 As previously mentioned, relevant evidence can be
excluded for reasons of time consumption.168 Judges can put absolute
time limits—literally using chess clocks—on civil trials.169 If, after the
presentation of evidence at trial, the fact finder is completely uncertain of
which narrative is correct, rules of decision are imposed for that
uncertainty to define a verdict, rather than extend the inquiry.170
Standards of review can tie the hands of a judge to reverse a jury verdict
that is contrary to scientific evidence.171 Appellate judges cannot
overturn fact finding on the basis that the appellate judge believes the jury
got it wrong.172 Professor Dan Simon summarizes the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence as consistently affirming that “[d]efendants are [only]
promised procedural rights, not reliable evidence or accurate verdicts.”173
The system repeatedly and intentionally is set simply to be fair enough.174
This instinctively may seem wrong—or, put another way, out of sync
with intuitive notions of what is justice, and what individuals in society

166. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–11 (1972).
167. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90–102 (1970) (holding that a twelve-person jury
was not necessary for a trial by jury).
168. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see supra text accompanying notes 110–111 (discussing Federal
Rule of Evidence of 403).
169. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(O) (stating that “at any pretrial conference the court may
consider and take any appropriate action on . . . establishing a reasonable time limit allowed to
present evidence”).
170. See Allen & Stein, supra note 2, at 558–59 (explaining the standards for various burdens
of proof to be used when judges and jurors must decide cases in the face of uncertainty).
171. See Andrea Roth, Defying DNA: Rethinking the Role of the Jury in an Age of Scientific
Proof of Innocence, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1643, 1679–84 (2013) (mentioning cases where the verdicts
were inconsistent with scientific evidence); see generally Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating
Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV. 139 (2012) (suggesting the need to
reconsider the trial as the center of gravity for innocence protection given the rapid escalation in
the quality and quantity of scientific evidence which makes some forms of evidence more reliable
with time).
172. See, e.g., Stow v. Murashige, 389 F.3d 880, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Allowing an
appellate court to look behind a jury’s verdict conflicts with the rule that appellate courts should
not scrutinize jury verdicts. . . . [E]ven ‘egregiously erroneous’ jury verdicts are entitled to double
jeopardy effect . . . .”); accord Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (once a jury is
convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no further role for the appellate courts in
determining guilt).
173. SIMON, supra note 124, at 209.
174. Another aspect of systemic architecture supporting the same conclusion is the system-wide
view on jury nullification, which usually is hidden from the jury’s ken. See, e.g., Andrew D.
Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 257 (1996) (“Current practice—with
few exceptions—is not to instruct juries that they may nullify.”). A system that pursues subjective
fairness either allows the jury to determine the law, or empowers a jury to nullify the law. A system
that pursues procedural sufficiency either forbids or deeply discourages either approach.
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want from their courts. After all, if one asked almost anyone to envision
himself or herself in court and to ask—“What if I were the accused
criminal?”; “What if I were the crime victim?”; “What if someone had
not honored a contract they had with me?”; “What if someone got hurt
while in my house?”—one would generally expect the instinctive answer
to be: “We want the court to do the right thing.”
Some might assert that the “real” answer is, “I want to win,”175 but
even phrased this way, the wish to win is not the craven answer it might
at first appear to be. One wants to win because one wants the courts “to
be fair,” or “to reach the right answer.” It is natural that usually one
correlates the fair or right position to that of his or her own position.176
So under this construct, the “why” of American courts is substantive
fairness.177
But that answer fails under even nominal introspection. Seeking a
correct answer cannot be the goal of the courts, because as discussed
supra, actually knowing with certainty what happened is not
attainable.178 And individually, even one’s most craven self quickly
understands this when thought about.
What people want is the most justice they can afford. There would be
a price people consider to be too much. Other than a major criminal case,
it would be rare if there were a trial where a party took the position of
“whatever I have is what I am willing to pay in order to win.” So what
people actually want is not fair, but rather fair enough.179 And as soon
as one moves from fair to fair enough, one has moved to a notion of
procedural sufficiency.
The scholarly work of those who study fairness can help in
understanding what fair enough looks like—or, in other words, what
175. THANE ROSENBAUM, THE
TO DO WHAT’S RIGHT 3–4 (2004).

MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE: WHY OUR LEGAL SYSTEM FAILS

176. See Tyler, supra note 162, at 117 (“[A]s past studies have found, those receiving favorable
outcomes think that those outcomes and the procedures used to arrive at them are fairer.”).
177. See Sevier, supra note 137, at 214–16 (explaining differences in what people seek in the
justice system).
178. See supra Part I (alluding to the truth in court rooms).
179. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), (“[I]dentification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”); Kaplow, supra note 38, at 373–78 (“The regulation of lawyers in litigation . . . is
appropriately viewed . . . as an aspect of procedural rules concerned with achieving accurate
outcomes while not incurring excessive costs.”).
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generically counts as procedural sufficiency. The work can be
summarized (perhaps crudely) as requiring a reasonable opportunity to
tell one’s story to a neutral decision maker.180
To elaborate, procedural sufficiency requires, first, that all sides of a
dispute perceive that they have the opportunity to prevail; it cannot be
perceived as a rigged enterprise. Any other conclusion would be
antithetical to any definition of fairness.181
This opportunity to prevail is a necessary, but not sufficient, aspect of
any system that seeks to be fair enough. After all, flipping a coin is fair
in the sense of an opportunity to prevail, yet inadequate in achieving the
goal that the parties had a nonrigged chance to win because they deserved
to win.182 What is also necessary to get to this more fundamental sense
of fairness is an opportunity to present one’s side of the merits—to tell
one’s story—coupled with a belief that the decision was intended in good
faith to be merit-based.183 And, of course, a system that gives each side
the opportunity to tell their story and leaves each side with the belief that
they were heard by a decision maker who tried to do the right thing,
fundamentally meets the first requirement of a system where each side
perceives that it has the opportunity to prevail.
A dispute resolution system that has these aspects—or a fair shot in a
nonrigged game184—is one that seeks an acceptable approximation of a
180. P. Christopher Earley et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and
Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957–58
(1990); Tyler, supra note 162, at 121–23, 128–31.
181. See generally Blader & Tyler, supra note 162 (examining two studies testing the fourcomponent model of procedural fairness).
182. Conversation with Scott Soames, Professor and Director, The School of Philosophy,
University of Southern California (Oct. 10, 2014).
183. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–28 (2005) (considering what due process
protections Ohio must afford inmates before assigning them to a maximum-security prison with
highly restrictive conditions); City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716–19 (2003) (holding that the
city may tow an illegally parked automobile without a “prompt hearing”); FDIC v. Mallen, 486
U.S. 230, 242–46 (1988) (upholding a statute authorizing the FDIC to suspend an indicted bank
official without a hearing); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1978)
(holding public utility termination of services for nonpayment without affording customers an
opportunity to dispute bills deprived customers of due process). See Tyler, supra note 162, at 125–
31 (examining a study on the criteria citizens use to address the fairness of legal procedures). See
also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to
be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The Court has applied the Mathews framework to a wide variety of due
process challenges.
184. In this context, “game” is not a diminutive term. Rather,
[g]ame theory concerns the behaviour [sic] of decision-makers whose decisions affect
each other. Its analysis is from a rational rather than a psychological or sociological
viewpoint. It is indeed a sort of umbrella theory for the rational side of social science,
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fair result, and so can be said to be fair enough, or procedurally sufficient,
from the perspective of a participant in a trial.185 That would seem to be
what a litigant will accept as enough when seeking fairness.
2. Individual Fairness and Collective Fairness
But now, perhaps one needs to briefly check himself or herself,
because a further challenge is that fair enough may look and feel very
different when one talks about his or her trial as opposed to talking about
someone else’s trial. Consider the question: “How much of my money
am I willing to invest to be confident the court reached the right answer
in my case?” Now consider the question: “How much of my money am I
willing to pay (in taxes, typically) to be confident the court reached the
right answer in your case?” One would expect that the answer to these
two questions to differ.186
Put another way, it is the nature of public courts that such courts are,
by definition, forums where the money of many (our money) funds a
court used by few (your dispute). So can one have confidence that a fair
shot in a nonrigged game is in harmony with a societal norm of fair
enough across the cultural heterogeneity of the United States?187 Or

where “social” is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human players
(computers, animals, plants). Its methodologies apply in principle to all interactive
situations, especially in economics, political science, evolutionary biology, and
computer science.
R.J. Aumann, Game Theory, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N.
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
185. See Shari Siedman Diamond & Leslie Ellis, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition:
Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1040–41 (2003) (explaining
why people are more willing to accept and respect decisions when those decisions are produced by
fair procedures).
186. See Kaplow, supra note 38, at 328–30, 382–99 (explaining that accuracy is very expensive
and inefficient and that there are differences between an individual’s interests and societal
interests).
187. Professor Tom Tyler, Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale University,
interviewed 652 Chicagoans who had some sort of experience with the police and found that
[s]even aspects of procedural justice make an independent contribution to assessments
of process fairness: the effort of the authorities to be fair; their honesty; whether their
behavior is consistent with ethical standards; whether opportunities for representation
are given; the quality of the decisions made; whether opportunities to appeal decisions
exist; and whether the behavior of the authorities shows bias.
Tyler, supra note 162, at 121. It is difficult to use these factors more specifically, as the factors in
detail appear to be fluid from one culture to another. See Rebecca A. Anderson & Amy L. Otto,
Perceptions of Fairness in the Justice System: A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 31 SOC. BEHAV. &
PERS. 557, 562–63 (2003) (explaining how legal systems are the product of a society’s culture and
a reflection of that culture—which combats the idea that there are widely held preferences for
procedures).

7.5_KLEIN_DOCUMENT1 (1-79).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Truth and Legitimacy

1/16/17 12:01 PM

43

more simply, what is the precise role of publicly funded justice in
American communal life?
The court system seeks sufficient closure to insure societal stability
(i.e., peace in the streets).188 Essentially, societies without just courts are
more likely to be unstable and violent. One needs to look no further than
the public responses to the verdict of acquittal in the O.J. Simpson
multiple homicide trial, or the grand jury decision of whether to indict the
police officers who shot Michael Brown or choked to death Eric Garner
to understand the potency of the slogan, “No Justice, No Peace.”189
Communities that do not believe the justice system provides just
resolution of righteous grievances take to the streets. The relationship
between distrust of an institution and civil disobedience is the heart of
defining an institution like the justice system as legitimate and will be
discussed infra in detail.190 But for the current juncture of this Article, it
suffices to simply recognize that the relevant perspective of whether the
courts are just is not only that of the litigant, but also, and perhaps
primarily, that of the broader community in which the courts reside. So
one must ask: What aspects of the courts support a community belief that
the courts are just?
3. Perceptions of Justice and Actual Justice
Asking about community perspective exposes another nuance of the
explication of justice—that belief in the courts is a meta-level191 belief.
188. See Heather J. Smith & Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice and Social Movements 1 (Inst. of
Indus. Relations, Working Paper No. 61, 1995), http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/6195.pdf (“People’s actual behavior is . . . strongly linked to views about justice and injustice. A
wide variety of studies link justice judgments to positive behaviors . . . . Conversely, other studies
link the lack of justice to sabotage, theft, and on a collective level, to the willingness to rebel or
protest.” (internal citations omitted)).
189. See Latest Updates: Protests Nationwide as More Troops Are Called to Ferguson, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), http://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/live-updates-grand-jurydecision-darren-wilson-ferguson/ (describing the protests and violence following the grand jury
decision to not indict Darren Wilson); Andy Newman, Reaction to Eric Garner Grand Jury
Decision, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/03/the-death-oferic-garner-the-grand-jury-decision/ (describing the protests following the grand jury decision to
not indict the officers involved in Eric Garner’s death); O.J. Simpson Verdict Ten Years Later, PBS
FRONTLINE (Oct. 4, 2005), www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/oj/view (examining the various
racial groups’ reactions after the O.J. Simpson verdict).
190. See infra Part II (examining the possible tension between the meaning of truth in courts on
the one hand, and the basis of the legitimacy of the courts as a societal institution on the other hand).
191. “A level or degree (of understanding, existence, etc.) which is higher and often more
abstract than those levels at which a subject, etc., is normally understood or treated; a level which
is above, beyond, or outside other levels, or which is inclusive of a series of lower levels.”
Metalevel,
OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/metalevel (last visited Oct. 9,
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This is the belief that the courts are doing their jobs sufficiently. Two
examples—one large and one small—help illustrate this point.
First, consider South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(“TRC”).192 The theoretical predicate for the TRC was that for “[a]
country transitioning from authoritarian rule to democracy . . . [where]
conventional institutions such as courts . . . [were] not viewed as being
neutral enough.”193
The TRC “set an international standard,”
successfully bringing stability in an environment where there was a more
important societal need than criminal punishment.194 The lesson of the
TRC is that the greatest value of expending public resources on
determining what happened is not to achieve some morally acceptable
outcome—appropriate retribution in a criminal matter or allocation of
responsibility in a civil matter—but rather, to increase the likelihood of
communal tranquility.195
Now, consider the anecdotal story of a cab driver in Washington
D.C.196 The driver—an immigrant from Eritrea—was frustrated that
when he challenged traffic tickets, the courts promised him a presumption
of innocence, but then informed him that he would have to pay the tickets
unless he could produce proof that he had not committed a violation. He
concluded that the system did not give him a presumption of innocence,
but rather gave a pass to the City in proving his guilt when what was at

2016).
192. See generally Justice Albert L. Sachs, Honoring the Truth in Post-Apartheid South Africa,
26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 799 (2001) (telling multiple stories about the South African Truth
Commission); Justice Albie Sachs, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 34 CONN.
L. REV. 1037 (2002) (discussing Justice Albie Sachs’ experiences as a South African Freedom
Fighter).
193. Daryl Balia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 295, 296 (Jack Rabin ed., 2005); accord Paul Van Zyl,
Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 647 (1999) (discussing the TRC’s final report).
194. Balia, supra note 193, at 297. South Africa raises reconciliation to such a high value that
on January 30, 2015 the government granted parole to Eugene De Kock, described as “Prime Evil,”
for his role as an apartheid era assassin “in the interests of nation building and reconciliation.”
Grant Foster, Apartheid’s Prime Evil, Eugene De Kock, to Go Free, SA PROMO MAGAZINE (Jan.
30, 2015), https://www.sapromo.com/apartheids-prime-evil-eugene-de-kock-to-go-free/7258.
195. Trials as a search for truth and trials as a mechanism for tranquility are the two predominant
explanations of the role of courts, but Mark Cammack offers a third explanation—trials as an
attempt to “say something,” by which he means, “trials depict and thereby validate assumptions
about the nature of fact and the authority of law on which the legitimacy of the practice depends.
The process, in effect, proves its own premises.” Cammack, supra note 43, at 783–84, 789. A
fourth interpretation is offered by Charles Nesson, who explains how trials can be understood as a
statement to the community about how certain behavior will be judged. Charles Nesson, The
Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1357, 1379 (1985).
196. Interview with Yonas Teseay, Cab Driver (Jan. 5, 2015).
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issue was only a fifty-dollar ticket. Fifty dollars was a lot of money to
him. Yet he did not appeal because it was too much time and paperwork
to fight a fifty-dollar ticket; it cost him more than fifty dollars in lost time
in his cab, and the fine doubled if he lost the appeal.
From these two examples one can see that individual and community
meanings of justice may differ in specific trials, but broadly are the same.
South Africa realized the importance of a process sacrificing fair
individual retribution to the greater good of gaining closure through a
collective, societal airing of what had happened. The cab driver, and
arguably for good reason, does not believe his trials were even a fair
process, much less a fair outcome. But his trials were fair enough in that
he was not motivated to engage in social unrest, and to the broader
community he had enough of a “fair shake.” To insure domestic
tranquility and stability, a system must, at least almost always, give a fair
enough process so that the loser, however grudgingly, will accept the
result.
This formulation of justice—a concept that is to some a significant, but
immeasurable, degree rooted in public perception and public
confidence—is explicitly and repeatedly recognized by the Supreme
Court. For example, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court wrote that
“[c]ommunity participation in the administration of the criminal law . . .
is . . . critical to public confidence in the criminal justice system.”197 In
his dissent in Bush v. Gore, Justice Stevens famously wrote that the
majority opinion undermined the “public treasure” of “the public’s
confidence in the Court itself,” and thus “was a wound that may harm . .
. the Nation.”198 In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, the Court
wrote:
The open trial thus plays as important a role in the administration of
justice today as it did for centuries before our separation from England.
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending
trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed;
the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that
established procedures are being followed and that deviations will
become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system.199
197. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
99 (1986) (prohibiting race-based peremptory strikes of jurors will strengthen “public respect for
our criminal justice system”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (“The very integrity
of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence.”).
198. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157–58 (2000).
199. Press Enter. Co. v. California, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984).
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In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice
O’Connor wrote:
The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in
the instance of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the
Judiciary of the United States and specifically upon this Court. As
Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, the Court
cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to
a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees.
The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance
and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare
what it demands.200

Similar conclusions are reached by scholars.201 For example, Leslie
Ellis and Shari Siedman Diamond—summarizing the work of several
social scientists—wrote:
[T]he level of satisfaction people feel with the decision of a trier of fact
is strongly influenced by their perceptions of fairness of the procedures
used by the trier to reach that decision. That is, even when actual
outcomes were held constant and even when those outcomes were
negative, the perceived fairness of the procedures strongly influenced
the party’s satisfaction with the verdict and willingness to accept the
legitimacy of the decision. These and more recent studies of procedural
justice show that people are more willing to accept decisions and to
adhere to agreements over time when they perceive those decisions as
having been produced by fair procedures. Moreover, the authority and
perceived legitimacy of the institutions that produce the decisions are
enhanced when the procedures used to produce the decisions are viewed
as fair, even when those decisions involved unfavorable outcomes. The
comfort and positive reactions of litigants are of course important in and
of themselves. But building perceptions of procedural justice has an
additional important payoff: enhanced authority and legitimacy
increase the likelihood that the parties will accept the jury’s finding.
The more legitimate the process is perceived to be, the more likely
participants are to accept the outcome, positive or negative.202

Professor James Gibson has conducted extensive contemporary work
studying the prevalence of, reasons for, and stability of acceptance of the
legitimacy of a court decision or other governmental action without
regard to whether one agrees or disagrees with it.203 That work can be
200. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
201. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 195, at 1367–68 (explaining why and how citizens and parties
accept court verdicts).
202. Diamond & Ellis, supra note 185, at 1039–40.
203. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Measuring Attitudes toward the United States
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summarized as concluding that public confidence not only is critical to
the system, but verifiably exists and is robust in the courts.
4. Conclusions About Belief in Courts
So what insights can one draw from this discussion of the meaning of
justice in the American courts, and in turn better understand belief in
courts? Justice in the American courts is a procedural notion more than
a substantive notion; the idea is to have courts that are fair enough.
Justice is based on procedural access to courts and neutrality of decisions.
Justice may depend as much on perception as reality. And while the
community at large may have a different notion of fair enough than the
notions of individual participants in a trial, the two ideas are closely
related. Because a system that is not usually perceived as fair enough can
lead to mass unrest, the avoidance of which is a material, and arguably
predominating, goal of the system.
What is belief in courts? It means the courts have procedures for
dispute resolution that society, generally, perceives and accepts as a fair
opportunity—or perhaps a fair enough opportunity—to present one’s
position to a neutral decision maker.
E. Understanding Truth in Courts
Let us now return to this Article’s original formulation of “knowledge
requires truth, justification, and belief.”204 In the context of truth in
courts, one can now restate this formulation as: Reaching a “correct
enough” resolution, biasing toward certainty when the stakes involve
liberty, and staying near neutral when the stakes are private relationships;
relevant facts both within the evaluative skills of jurors’ competence and
Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 354–55 (2003) (examining why unfavorable Supreme
Court decisions are still respected by citizens and politicians); Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Why Do
People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based
Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 187, 198 (2005) (explaining how institutional legitimacy allows
citizens to accept decisions they do not agree with); James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality
of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and “New-Style” Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 59, 59 (2008) (discussing the effect that judicial elections have on court legitimacy);
James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343,
344–46 (1998) (introducing theories which might explain the perceived legitimacy of the court).
See generally DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 278 (1965) (stating that
legitimacy is that which “gives explicit consideration to the expectations of society . . . and whether
an organization appears to be complying with the expectations of the societies within which it
operates”); James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (2009) (examining the legitimacy of truth commissions); James
L. Gibson & Michael J Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdoms,
and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2014) (discussing the
institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36 (discussing knowledge and “probability”).
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that do not promote defined undesirable behaviors external to the trial;
procedures for dispute resolution that society generally perceives and
accepts as a fair opportunity—or perhaps a fair enough opportunity—to
present one’s position to a neutral decision maker; and “truth.”
From this, one can isolate and formulate an understanding of truth in
courts. At least since Plato’s shadows on the cave, philosophers have
recognized the elusive nature of objective reality. A court system can
never reach a conclusive determination of what actually happened in a
dispute. Truth in courts is a sufficient—albeit intentionally incomplete—
correspondence of judgments of what happened, to what actually
happened. Put somewhat differently, truth in courts refers to the relative
role a colloquial meaning of accuracy has in the family of other values
courts seek to advance; meaning there has been adequate procedural
process to support a general communal sense of systemic fairness without
regard to the outcome in a particular case. This is because courts
unquestionably compromise the likelihood of achieving colloquial
accuracy to serve other concerns.
As this Article saw in its exploration of justification, this balancing of
colloquial accuracy against other values sometimes emerges quite
dramatically.205 In response to the pattern of societally unacceptable
treatment of rape victims in the courts, evidence codes were revised to
provide rape shield laws.206 These laws exclude evidence unquestionably
relevant to the defense, for reasons external to achieving a correct trial
verdict.207
In response to police misconduct, the Supreme Court has ruled to
exclude evidence gathered during interrogation which occurs before
“Miranda warnings” are given.208 Court exclusion of this testimony is
205. See supra Part I.B (exploring justification in trial courts).
206. See generally Anthony J. Bocchino & J. Alexander Tanford, Rape Victim Shield Laws and
the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544 (1980) (describing state legislatures attempts to pass
shield laws to protect rape victims by limiting a criminal defendant’s ability to present to the jury
evidence of past sexual history); Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape
Shield Laws, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1245, 1247–50 (1989) (explaining various rape shield statutes).
207. Tuerkheimer, supra note 206, at 1249–50.
208. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.”). See Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (And Still Need to Learn)
about the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 8
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 617–19 (1983) (explaining how NIJ’s statistics regarding a study on
the exclusionary rule are misleading); see generally Nardulli, supra note 107 (examining the costs
of three exclusionary rules through data collected from multiple cases across nine countries
criminal courts).
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controversial precisely because it keeps out relevant evidence.209
In espionage and terrorism cases, obtaining a verdict is compromised
by the security classification, which keeps some facts out of evidence.210
Here, national security trumps accuracy.211
While this Article has separately explored justification in courts, belief
in courts, and knowledge in courts, in many instances these phrases have
overlapping themes that emerge in truth in courts. So while the Rules
essentially define justification in courts, some Rules also serve as
animating the related concept of truth in courts. For example, Rule 403
explicitly states: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more
of the following: . . . undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”212 In others words, colloquial accuracy can be
subservient to some degree to concerns of time and efficiency.
There are similar overlaps between truth in courts and knowledge in
courts. The explication of knowledge in courts relies heavily on burdens
of proof as decisional rules. Burdens also function as evidence regulation
rules: who presents evidence first, and how much they are able to present.
In this way, burdens of proof are also integral to setting examples of, and
thus understanding, truth in courts. For example, presumptions of
discriminatory intent in employment actions shift the burden to the
defendant to present evidence of nondiscriminatory intent,213 and the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove
negligence in settings of highly suspicious accidents.214 Both instances
set balance points between accuracy and finality in evidence regulation,
and thus in discerning what is meant by truth in courts.
And one sees overlap between the concerns animating the meaning of
truth in courts and of belief in courts. Is there too much frivolous
litigation, or too many runaway juries, or both, or neither? Are there too

209. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. See also Turner, supra note 112, at 829–31 (explaining the
application and developing perception of the exclusionary rule in United States law).
210. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1263–66 (2007) (introducing the theoretical debate regarding the role
of government secrecy and the tensions it has created).
211. Id.
212. FED. R. EVID. 403.
213. See R. Alexander Acosta & Eric J. Von Vorys, Bursting Bubbles and Burdens of Proof:
Disagreements on the Summary Judgment Standard in Disparate Treatment Employment
Discrimination Cases, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 207, 210–14 (1997–1998) (discussing the evidentiary
burdens employers and employees face in employee discrimination cases).
214. See William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitor in California, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 234 (1949)
(noting situations of when the burden to disprove negligence shifts to the defendant).
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few paths to recovery, or too strict evidentiary rules, or too little
supervision of police practices? Concerns about these and other, similar
belief questions spawn calls for reform in recurring patterns.215
The meaning of truth in courts is perhaps best illustrated by two
Supreme Court opinions—one civil and one criminal—and each an
unambiguous elevation of external concerns over colloquial accuracy.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,216 the Supreme Court considered the case of Javid
Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani who had overstayed his student visa and was
caught up in the post-9/11 security sweeps. Iqbal asserted that both the
decision to detain him and the conditions of his confinement were based
on his religion and/or national origin.217 But his allegations became
enmeshed in an earlier narrative about frivolous litigation, so the Court
held, to reduce the frequency of frivolous litigation, that a trial judge
could dismiss Iqbal’s complaint at the pleading stage.218 Simply put, the
Court held that reducing the incidence of frivolous litigation was worth
the price of some erroneous dismissals of meritorious cases.219
The Court even more dramatically rejected the primacy of colloquial
accuracy in Herrera v. Collins, the second case.220 Herrera was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He filed a habeas petition,
supported by affidavits showing his actual innocence.221 The Court’s
opinion framed the issue not as whether the State could execute an
innocent man, but whether a man who had been convicted of murder in
accordance with due process is entitled to habeas relief based on new
exculpatory evidence.222 In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor wrote, “Petitioner is not innocent, in any sense of the word. . .
. He was tried before a jury of his peers, with the full panoply of
protections that our Constitution affords criminal defendants. At the
conclusion of that trial, the jury found petitioner guilty beyond a

215. See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day In Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (examining the use of summary judgment and
motions to dismiss in relation to the federal judicial system); Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous
Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J.
447 (2004) (describing cases and controversies around frivolous claims in lawsuits).
216. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2008).
217. Id. at 667–70.
218. Klein, supra note 144, at 593–94, 599–605.
219. Id.
220. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
221. Id. at 393.
222. Id. at 399–400.
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reasonable doubt.”223
Truth in courts is accuracy enough as balanced against other system
values, such as the likelihood of truly new and controlling evidence, the
reasons the evidence is so late forthcoming, and the adequacy and
exhaustiveness of the process already afforded. None of these values
would suffice to reject consideration of new evidence if colloquial
accuracy was what was meant by truth in courts.224
So truth in courts means the balancing point the justice system draws
as the boundary between complete accuracy, on the one hand, and
competing societal values, both internal and external, to the courts, on the
other hand, to have a sufficient correspondence of judgments of what
happened and what actually happened.
II. “LEGITIMACY,” OR WHY THE MEANING OF TRUTH IN COURTS MIGHT
MATTER
While it is intellectually interesting to explore the meaning of truth in
courts, the exploration leaves open the inquiry of whether the meaning
matters in any meaningful way. It does, and the starting point of
understanding that importance is to recognize a key conclusion from the
explication of truth in courts. In seeking accurate enough, one would say
that truth in courts describes what courts do differently from what the
general public would suppose courts do. The reason that the meaning of
truth in courts matters is because this dissonance can undermine the
legitimacy of the courts as a social institution.
In David Easton’s third work, in his project on empirically oriented
political theory, Easton describes “the inculcation of a sense of
legitimacy” as “probably the most effective device for regulating the flow
223. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun dissented,
framing the issue as “whether the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been
validly convicted and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly
discovered evidence.” Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Herrera’s last words before he was
executed four months later were, “I am an innocent man, and something very wrong is taking place
tonight.”
Offender
Information,
TEX.
DEP’T
CRIM.
JUST.,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_info/hererraleonellast.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2016);
accord In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never held
that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial
but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is “actually” innocent. Quite to the contrary, we
have repeatedly left that question unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any claim
based on alleged “actual innocence” is constitutionally cognizable.” (citations omitted)).
224. When Dan Simon and Laurie Levinson write about accuracy concerns—they advocate for
changing the priority of accuracy in the system, not for making it the only value on the list. See
SIMON, supra note 124, at 217–22; Laurie L. Levinson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of
Post-Conviction Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CALIF. L. REV. 545, 572 (2015).

7.5_KLEIN_DOCUMENT1 (1-79).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

52

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/16/17 12:01 PM

[Vol. 48

of diffuse support in favor both of the authorities and of the regime.”225
Easton posits the question whether a political system could “survive
without . . . feelings of legitimacy,” and answers that “such convictions”
are “helpful and perhaps even necessary.”226 To avoid disorder,
authorities have a natural right to expect compliance with their devised
regimes.227 “Regardless of what the members may feel about the wisdom
of the action of authorities, obedience may flow from some rudimentary
convictions” that “the authorities . . . are legitimate.”228
Easton’s work introduced the concept of “Legitimacy Theory,” which
Easton defined as that which “gives explicit consideration to the
expectations of society . . . and whether an organization appears to be
complying with the expectations of the societies within which it
operates.”229 Institutions with general, rather than specific, support are
said to be legitimate, meaning the institution enjoys support even when
society disagrees with the institution’s specific acts.230
As Easton’s definition highlights, it is potentially problematic when an
institution is not acting within societal expectations of that institution.
And so it bears understanding how Legitimacy Theory applies to the
justice system and whether it predicts a concern from a dissonance
between societal understandings of what courts do and what courts
actually do.
A. Legitimacy of the Justice System
Legitimacy of legal institutions is a concept familiar to international
law.231 This Part explores judicial legitimacy in a domestic context—or
put another way, this Part questions what gives courts legitimacy and
what role truth plays in that legitimacy. That is a notion that has received
far less attention.
1. Legitimacy of the United States Supreme Court
Almost all of the scholarly work applying Legitimacy Theory to the
justice system focuses on the Supreme Court’s decisions, and concludes
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

EASTON, supra note 203, at 278.
Id. at 278–79.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 279–80.
Id.
Craig Deegan, Legitimacy Theory, in METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH: THEORIES, METHODS AND ISSUES 161, 161 (Zahirui Hoque ed., 2006). See also
EASTON, supra note 203, at 273 (explaining the Legitimacy Theory).
231. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990) (explaining why international law has compliance pull).
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that the Court has a deep reservoir of legitimacy.232 Despite Justice John
Paul Stevens’s poignantly expressed concerns in his dissent in Bush v.
Gore,233 “in the long run, public perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy
were not adversely affected” by that decision, nor any decision, and
“public support for the Supreme Court does not appear to turn on citizens’
ideological agreement with its specific policy decisions.”234 The Court
enjoys broad legitimacy.
2. Legitimacy of the Trial Courts
“Despite the policy import of state courts, only a small number of
studies have examined citizen support for state courts . . . and nearly all
of these have analyzed only a single city or state’s citizens’ views towards
its courts.”235 For this reason, in 2008, Professors Damon Cann and Jeff
Yates identified and applied to state trial judges the metrics on which trial
court legitimacy rests: diffuse (or general) support allowing an institution
to persist and retain its authority without regard to agreement with
specific decisions.236 They identified four bases: (1) belief that judges
are trustworthy and honest; (2) belief that judges are fair; (3) belief that
courts provide equal justice; and (4) belief that decisions are based on fact
and law.237
Professors Cann and Yates confined their focus to judges. But the
institutional insiders positioned to influence the honesty, fairness,
neutrality, and justification of trial court decisions are not just judges—
they are also lawyers and juries. So to understand the nature—and the
232. See Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown Institutional Legitimacy: Assessing Citizens’
Diffuse Support for Their State Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 297, 299 (2008) (“A wealth of scholarship
exists on the topic of public support of and views toward the United States Supreme Court.”).
233. See text accompanying supra note 173 (noting that Professor Dan Simon summarizes the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of defendants’ procedural rights).
234. Cann & Yates, supra note 232, at 297. See also, James L. Gibson et al., Losing, But
Accepting: Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the Symbols of Judicial Authority, 48 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 837, 837–38 (2014) (referring to Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy
and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 375 (2006)); James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson,
The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdoms, and Recent Challenges
Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SC. (2014) (summarizing how symbols reinforce the legitimacy
of Courts and how Legitimacy Theory supports this idea); James L. Gibson, Legitimacy Is for
Losers: The Role of Institutional Legitimacy and the Symbols of Judicial Authority in Inducing
Acquiescence to Disagreeable Court Rulings, Keynote Address at the 62nd Nebraska Symposium
on Motivation (Apr. 24–25, 2014) (explaining broad legitimacy among courts).
235. Cann & Yates, supra note 232, at 300 (citations omitted). For the purpose of this Article,
Cann and Yates’ study of “state courts” can be equated to the focus on “American courts” or “trial
courts.”
236. Id. at 303–05.
237. Id.
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fragility or resilience—of the legitimacy of the trial courts, this Article
examines all three—judges, lawyers, and juries.
a. Judges and Legitimacy
To the extent that empirical work on the legitimacy of trial courts has
been done, it has looked at legitimacy and judges. There is reason that
researchers have engaged in this specific study. One 2013 poll found that
87 percent of voters in states where judges were elected believed that
direct campaign donations and independent spending either had “some”
or “a great deal” of influence on judges’ decisions.238 Studying the state
of Georgia, Damon Cann found that attorney “campaign contributions
influence judicial decisionmaking” in the attorney’s cases before that
judge.239 Also, citizens seem aware of it—partisan elections eroded
societal goodwill toward courts.240 Yet, while undermined to some
degree, “state courts enjoy the diffuse support of citizens, and thus
citizens believe in the legitimacy of their state courts even when they do
not agree with their policy outputs.”241 When focusing on judges,
Professors Cann and Yates—summarizing and extending the work of
others—found, “on balance, Americans generally hold favorable
attitudes toward their state courts.”242 Concern about neutrality of judges
does undermine, but does not overcome, a belief in trial court legitimacy.
b. Lawyers and Legitimacy
It is not hard to document the public disregard for lawyers.243 And it
238. See Press Release, Justice at Stake, New Poll: Vast Majority of Voters Fear Campaign
Cash Skews Judges’ Decisions (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/pressreleases16824/?new_poll_vast_majority_of_voters_fear_campaign_cash_skews_judges_decisions&show
=news&newsID=17594 (measuring the fear of citizens regarding the perceived effect of campaign
donations’ influence in courtrooms).
239. Damon M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisonmaking,
3 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 281, 292 (2007).
240. Cann & Yates, supra note 232, at 313.
241. Id. at 316.
242. Id. at 304–05.
243. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Bad Lawyers in the Movies, 24 NOVA L. REV. 533, 533–49
(1999–2000) (investigating the connection between the negative portrayal of lawyers in film and
public opinion of lawyers); Marc Galanter, Robert S. Marx Lecture: The Faces of Mistrust: The
Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 807–
35 (1998) (theorizing how lawyer mistrust developed through history and pop culture); Bruce A.
Green, “The Whole Truth?”: How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 699, 700–04 (1992) (explaining how following the rules of evidence can make lawyers appear
deceitful to juries); Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1405 1405–20 (1999) (discussing the public image problems lawyers face and how
they developed); Cliff Martin & T. Karena Dees, The Truth About Truthfulness: The Proposed
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is not hard to isolate what underlies this disregard. The public believes
that the behavior of lawyers distorts the ability of courts to discern the
truth.244
There is also a broad concern that the system advantages the litigant
with the lawyer best skilled at manipulating the rules.245 As the late
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in his dissent in Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co.:
What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation’s judicial
system is the perception that litigation is just a game, that the party with
the most resourceful lawyer can play it to win, that our seemingly
interminable legal proceedings are wonderfully self-perpetuating but
incapable of delivering real-world justice.246

But in the context of legitimacy, Justice Scalia’s concern with
“resourceful lawyers” could describe either of two circumstances, and the
two circumstances are not of equal import to the legitimacy of the courts.
Resourceful lawyers could be cheaters, players violating rules and
thereby undermining an otherwise legitimate system architecture.
Alternatively, resourceful lawyers could be lawyers who have seen that
the rules of the system leave room to influence the likely outcome of
trials, but this would suggest some illegitimacy in the system architecture
itself. It seems to be the perception of the latter of these two descriptions
that Ninth Circuit Justice Alec Kozinski lamented in a recent dissenting
Opinion:
When we take the judicial oath of office, we swear to “administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich
. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 453. I understand this to mean that we must not
merely be impartial, but must appear to be impartial to a disinterested
observer. . . . [Petitioner here would] have had a fairer shake in a
tribunal run by marsupials. . . . How can a court committed to justice,
as our court surely is, reach a result in which the litigant who can afford
a lawyer is forgiven its multiple defaults while the poor, uneducated,
un-counseled petitioner has his feet held to the fire?247

Therefore, in the absence of research on the impacts of lawyer
Commentary to Rule 4.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
777, 779–81 (2002) (noting that the public disregard also applies in the mediation context).
244. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, supra note 243, at 700–04 (stating that following the rules of
evidence can make lawyers appear deceitful to juries); Martin & Dees, supra note 243, at 779–81
(explaining the negative public perception of lawyers).
245. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 2 , at 1034–35 (“It becomes evident the search for truth fails
too much of the time. The rules and devices accounting for the failures come to seem less agreeable
and less clearly worthy than they once did. The skills of the advocate seem less noble . . . . The
advocate’s prime loyalty is to his client, not to truth as such.”).
246. Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 903 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247. Alvarez v. Tracy, 773 F.3d 1011, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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(mis)behavior on legitimacy—in other words, when the best one can do
is formulate a reasonable, yet untested, hypothesis of the relationship of
lawyers to legitimacy—it is important to better understand what
resourceful lawyers do and how the system responds to it.
The justice system is defined by a set of rules that purport to be
designed to promote certain outcomes. The justice system defines the
generic, target outcome as a fair shot in a nonrigged game. If one thinks
of this target in more economics-laden language, then one might call this
target a degree of probability—or acceptable approximation or
likelihood—of objective, substantive fairness (a correct result). But
paradoxically, the same rules designed to promote this approximately
objective, substantive fairness, provide opportunities for participants in
the system—typically anyone with disproportionate wealth—to distort
the likely outcome of the case.
Put simply, as Justice Alex Kozinski alluded,248 without regard to the
merits, money seems to increase one’s chances of winning (and poverty
makes it hard to win) even for a party staying within the rules. From the
perspective of the system, the distortive power of a wealthy party is an
actor playing within the letter, but not the spirit, of the rules. The system
designs rules to promote one sort of behavior. The way the rules are
written gives opportunities to engage in an inapposite—and from the
system perspective, counterproductive—set of behavior.
A colorful way of capturing the concept of a player using the rules of
the game, in a way that is counterproductive to the goals of the game, is
to call the player a “manipulator.”249 Because tactical manipulation
248. See supra text accompanying note 247.
249. In the culture of some sports—golf is a prime example—the spirit of the rules is paramount
and so a player is expected to self-report a rules violation. But the more usual approach in sports—
for example, international soccer—is that the spirit of the game is not paramount, and so breaking
the rules to gain advantage—if not caught—not only is acceptable but is expected. As the saying
goes in NASCAR, “If you ain’t cheatin’ you ain’t tryin.’” The discordant tension common in sports
between the rules and spirit of play is part of trial practice. The legal profession long has struggled
with the tension between zealous advocacy within the rules and promoting the ultimate ends of
justice. See, e.g., Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil
Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 565–78 (1996) (summarizing how “Rambo lawyers’” overly
zealous tactics hurt the legal process rather than help their clients); Frankel, supra note 2, at 1034–
35 (noting the advocate’s duty is to his client not so much the truth); Monroe H. Freedman, Judge
Frankel’s Search For Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1065 (1975) (arguing the adversarial system
is the best way to uncover the truth). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON
PROFESSIONALISM, . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:’ A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING
OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) [hereinafter ABA,
BLUEPRINT] (providing guidance on professionalism requirements for attorneys). Comment 1 to
Rule 1.3 (Diligence) of the ABA Model Rules seems to be of two minds, noting both that a lawyer
must “take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause” and that
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arguably is both within, and outside of, the rules, it is paradoxical
behavior.
A concrete example of a paradoxical manipulator in action is a
recurring settlement strategy in a civil case between parties who have
vastly different statuses of wealth. To promote the resolution of disputes
without resort to the courts, all United States jurisdictions have a variant
of the so-called “American Rule” that each side bear their own attorney’s
fees and costs without regard to who wins a case.250 Because of the
American Rule, a well-heeled party can leverage their wealth to force a
distorted result on a poorer party.251 Essentially, the threat of “I am
willing to spend disproportionately to the stakes of the matter”—often
expressed as “I will take this all the way to the Supreme Court!” or “I will
paper you under”—is a bluff the poorer party cannot afford to call.252 It
is the threat by a party with wealth to act apparently economically
irrationally, thus imposing an unbearable transaction cost on an opponent.
If the opponent believes the threat, then the opponent should abandon the
transaction or settle the case.253
This Article characterizes the wealthy actor’s behavior as “apparently
economically irrational” because there are at least two ways to describe
the behavior as rational. One is the instance where the wealthy actor’s
decision is irrational if contrasting the particular transaction costs with
a “lawyer is not bound . . . to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client.” Yet
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 empowers a court to punish and rectify lawyer behavior that
while potentially advancing a client’s likelihood of success has no possible grounding in the
substantive legal or factual merits of the case. In light of the inconsistency of law on the question,
I am comfortable—albeit intentionally provocative and arguably overly pejorative—calling a
wealthy tactician a “manipulator” for the purposes of this Article.
250. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010). See generally John
Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9, 27–36 (1984) (describing the American Rule and how it has developed).
251. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative
Models for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 69–73 (1982) (adopting the
English Rule rather than the American Rule may increase likelihood of settlement).
252. The settlement strategy of a “litigate or capitulate” offer is an ultimatum in a bilateral
negotiation involving asymmetrical information. For an economic analysis of such strategies, see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON.
404, 404–15(1984).
253. This is a variant of the problem economist Richard Selten labeled, “the chain-store
paradox.” Reinhard Selten, The Chain-Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 127–59 (1978).
See generally David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, On the Chain-Store Paradox and Predation:
Reputation for Toughness (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 551, June
1980) (describing the importance of acting tough and using threats to gain respect with the ChainStore paradox); David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J.
ECON. THEORY 253, 254–55 (1982) (summarizing that the more powerful party often influences
the reaction of the less powerful party).
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the size of the transaction, but rational when considered within a broader
context.254 For example, the Mattel Toy Company—whose flagship
product is the Barbie doll—might decide that to discourage all potential
infringers of its protected intellectual property in Barbie, it is willing to
spend a disproportionate amount to shut down a single infringer.255 This
is loosely conceptually related to the antitrust-prohibited behavior
described as “tying,” which is defined as using one’s larger economic
footprint to obtain competitive advantage in a submarket against niche
competitors.256
A second theory of rationality might be that the wealthy actor
understands that its opponent cannot sustain the transaction costs, and so
the actor will never actually call the bluff; in this instance the rational
choice is to make the threat.257 This is loosely conceptually related to the
antitrust-prohibited behavior described as creating unlawful barriers to
entry, which means that one variant that uses economic power to create
unacceptable transaction costs to potential competitors thereby dissuades
competitors from ever even entering a market.258
In their work focusing on judges, Professors Cann and Yates found
legitimacy conclusions persisted even though—among other factors—
there was a deep perception that justice favored wealthy and powerful
individuals.259 If the perception that judges favor the wealthy and
powerful does not undermine legitimacy, then perhaps the perception that
the wealthy and powerful can hire a lawyer more skilled at manipulating
the rules also does not undermine legitimacy; indeed, these may equate
to the same perception (that the wealthy and powerful hire skilled lawyers
who influence judges to dispense unequal justice).
But for the purposes of this Article, whether the well-heeled actor is
254. See Kreps & Wilson, supra note 253, at 256–66 (explaining how the “monopolists” payoffs
are more complex).
255. In the opening line of the opinion in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., Justice Kozinski
refers to Mattel as “Trademark Kong.” 296 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).
256. See, e.g., Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir.) (“Tying exists when
a seller refuses to sell one product unless the buyer also purchases another. To prove an illegal tie,
a party must show 1) a tying of two distinct products or services, 2) sufficient economic power in
the tying product market to affect the tied market, and 3) an effect on a substantial amount of
commerce in the tied market.”), cert. denied 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
257. See Kreps & Wilson, supra note 253, at 256–66 (describing how the “monopolists” payoffs
are more complex).
258. See, e.g., International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724
(5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he competitor is charging a price below its short-run, profit-maximizing price
and barriers to entry are great enough to enable the discriminator to reap the benefits of predation
before new entry is possible.”), cert. denied 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
259. Cann & Yates, supra note 232, at 304–05.
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rational or irrational does not matter, because under either scenario, the
other party should settle for an undervalued amount, or otherwise
abandon the litigation.260 In other words, a rational party acting
apparently irrationally can force a rational opponent to accept an
irrational outcome.261 Or as my wife puts it, “you cannot negotiate with
a three-year-old.”262
This is but one concrete example of the manipulator’s paradox, but
others abound. To name a few, the liberal rules of civil discovery
routinely offer the opportunity to impose expansive litigation costs on an
opponent.263 The multitude of possible pretrial motions presents a
similar opportunity,264 as does a strategic lawsuit against public
participation (“SLAPP”).265
260. Accord Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 264, 267 (1979) (“[L]itigants taking advantage of superior financial resources to bury their
opponents in an unending barrage of motions that make capitulation to unfair settlements the only
sensible alternative to continued litigation.”).
261. In the language of game theory by forcing one litigant into a position with no good choices
the game is an “iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategy” solution of a two-player “cheaptalk” version of a “dynamic game of incomplete information.” See ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME
THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 2-7, 173–253 (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 1972). That solution
is incongruous for a game theorist because an “iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategy”
solution of a game-theoretic problem assumes that it is common knowledge that all players are
acting rationally. Id. at 7. A key insight of the chain-store paradox is the incentive of an actor to
make a series of short-term irrational decisions to realize a long-term gain. See Kreps & Wilson,
supra note 253, at 1–2 (discussing the potential gains tenuous threats provide).
262. My spouse, Professor Lisa M. Black (too many times to count).
263. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989),
quoted and cited with approval in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)
(discussing how discovery abuse can push parties to settle and how this abuse is difficult for courts
to catch). But cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994)
(finding that discovery abuse is rare using methodological studies of the discovery process).
264. See, e.g., ABA, BLUEPRINT, supra note 249, at 290 (“The filing of frivolous motions and
complaints, asserting unfounded defenses, pursuing abusive discovery, and taking unwarranted
appeals glut our system of justice.”); Renfrew, supra note 260, at 267 (“The enormous reluctance
in the American court system to evaluate the merits of a case prior to trial . . . make [discovery]
abuse particularly costly. These problems are compounded by litigants taking advantage of
superior financial resources to bury their opponents in an unending barrage of motions that make
capitulation to unfair settlements the only sensible alternative to continued litigation.”).
265. See, e.g., Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1055–56 (2006) (“A SLAPP suit—a
strategic lawsuit against public participation—seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of
constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. . . .
The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP
statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid
exercise of constitutional rights.”); accord CAL. CIV. P. CODE §425.16(a) (West 2015) (“The
Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily
to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the
redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage
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Apparent structural loopholes—cheating opportunities—are in no way
unique to the civil dispute side of the aisle. The Supreme Court decisions
of Brady v. Maryland266 and Kyles v. Whitley267 require a prosecutor to
turn over all information favorable to a defendant. Brady and Kyles create
an opportunity for the prosecutor, within the rules, to “cheat.” As the
Supreme Court recognized in Kyles, “the prosecution . . . alone can know
what is undisclosed.”268 Because the doctrine is not phrased as “turn over
all information,” but rather is phrased in reference to evidence “material
either to guilt or punishment,”269 the prosecutor has an incentive to
characterize information as neutral, and thus never turn it over—a
decision that only the prosecutor will know.270
So lawyers may act within the rules in a way that distorts accuracy.
Nonetheless, one can see in court rules a slow, but nonetheless steady,
system response. While the justice system is rife with examples of the
manipulator’s paradox, many examples can be matched with a system
attempt to eliminate, or just ameliorate, the “bad” conduct.
For example, one can leverage the “American Rule” to extort a
settlement. In response to this dynamic, civil procedure rules around the
country have added devices such as California Code of Civil Procedure
section 998,271 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,272 which enable
any litigant party to make a settlement offer that, if rejected and bettered
at trial, will result in “loser pays.” These rules impose a modified cost
shifting by requiring the litigant who rejected the settlement offer to pay
his or her opponent’s fees and costs in whole or in part. In other words,
the rule makers recognized the manipulator’s paradox promoted by the

continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be
chilled through abuse of the judicial process.”). “SLAPP” is the acronym for Strategic Litigation
Against Public Policy—meaning a lawsuit that is used to bully or embarrass an opponent and
furthers no goal on the merits of substantive law.
266. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83–87 (1963).
267. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995).
268. Id. at 437.
269. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
270. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 58–71 (2011) (holding a district attorney’s
office may not be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train its prosecutors based on a single
Brady violation); Bennett L. Gersham, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 531 (2007) (“Brady actually invites prosecutors to bend, if not break,
the rules,’ and many prosecutors have become adept at Brady gamesmanship to avoid
compliance.”).
271. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998
272. FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
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American Rule and sought to ameliorate the distortive effect of the
rule.273
Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11274 was first inserted into
the Code and then repeatedly revised to make it increasingly harder for a
party to get away with tactics motivated by improper motives, which are
defined as any motive other than a merit-based motive.275 A variety of
state codes mimic Rule 11.276 Similar rule revisions curtail the
opportunity for discovery abuse.277 For example, California has adopted
an anti-SLAPP statute.278 Even revisions in criminal procedure are often
justified as deterring misbehavior or sharp practices by inside players to
the criminal justice system.279
What then can one conclude about lawyers and legitimacy? There
273. Kathryn Spier argues that the American rule facilitates settlement instances of
asymmetrical damage evaluations, and hinders settlement in instances of asymmetrical liability
assessments; she argues for a modified FRCP 68 rule of fee-shifting against a judge-set metric.
Kathryn Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. ECON. 197,
200–10 (1994); see, e.g., Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of
Litigation, 10 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 3, 25−26 (1990) (arguing that requiring a losing litigant to
pay the opponent’s expenses does not remedy the problem of the “American rule,” but that
requiring the posting of a refundable deposit does). For our purposes, the point is not whether Rule
68 is the best solution, but rather that as Spier confirms, fee-shifting rules can influence settlement
behaviors in profound ways, and that the system can influence litigant choices to promote particular
outcomes.
274. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
275. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the Report
of the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, 18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1149, 1165
(1986−1987) (“[T]he Commission endorses Rule 11 . . . . Everyone hopefully now recognizes that
lawyers should not file frivolous motions.”).
276. See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical
Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1094−1111
(1993−1994) (summarizing the various approaches the states take to applying Rule 11).
277. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (describing the sanctions for failure to make disclosures or
cooperate during discovery).
278. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 425.16.
279. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (“[T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule
‘is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.’”) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
217 (1960)); Katherine Sheridan, Comment, Excluding Coerced Witness Testimony to Protect a
Criminal Defendant’s Right to Due Process of Law and Adequately Deter Police Misconduct, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1221, 1224 (2011) (discussing Supreme Court limitations on coercive
interrogation techniques by police officers). See generally Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too
Seriously: The State’s Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1986−1987) (discussing
when state practices infringe on the fundamental, trial-related rights of the accused); Sabine Gless,
Truth or Due Process? The Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in Criminal Trials—Germany
(2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743530 (discussing German exclusionary rules). For a fuller
discussion by the United States Supreme Court (in majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions)
of various views on the balancing of criminal exclusionary rules of probative evidence with fair
trial rights, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482−89, 496−502, 508−15, 537−42 (1976).

7.5_KLEIN_DOCUMENT1 (1-79).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

62

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/16/17 12:01 PM

[Vol. 48

seems to be a push and pull between lawyers seeing opportunities to
“cheat” and rule responses that close those loopholes in whole or in part.
System rules routinely either encourage or passively allow lawyer
(mis)behavior, which decreases the likelihood that court judgments of
what happened will correspond to what actually happened. While the
system steadily tries to identify and crimp down on these opportunities,
the prevalence of them is robust. This prevalence plays into a preexisting
narrative of public perceptions of lawyers.280 And that, in turn, suggests
an unexplored vector of possible fragility in the legitimacy of trial courts.
c. Juries and Legitimacy
Just as there is a preexisting narrative of public perception of lawyers
that suggests an unexplored vector of possible fragility in the legitimacy
of trial courts, so too is the interplay of perception and legitimacy with
juries. It is not hard to find a robust critique of the American jury.281 The
often unstated, but apparent, commonality of jury criticism is the
underlying suspicion that juries get cases wrong a disturbing amount of

280. The “public perception” may also be the perception of lawyers themselves. See generally
Douglass N. Frenkel et al., Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (1998) (discussing concern within the legal community over a decline of
civility within the profession). If internal players actually and routinely are manipulating accuracy
either maliciously or through passive complicity, that is a further indicator of fragile systemic
legitimacy. See generally Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of
an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 915−20 (1999)
(describing the precarious line between ethical and unethical legal practice).
281. See, e.g., IRWIN GRISWOLD, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN’S REPORT 5–6 (1962–1963)
(statement of Dean Irwin Griswold) (arguing that if the goal is justice, juries should be abolished);
Warren E. Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary, 57 A.B.A. J. 855, 858 (1971) (expressing a
readiness to eliminate civil juries); Edward J. Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should Be
Abolished, 60 A.B.A. J. 570 (1974) (arguing, as the title describes, that federal civil jury trials
should be abolished). See generally Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the
Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 269 (1989) (discussing critiques of civil juries). In just one three-month period in 2013,
national criticism erupted over acquittal verdicts in two Florida criminal homicide trials. See Scott
Stump, Casey Anthony Judge Felt ‘Shock, Disbelief’ at Not Guilty Verdict, TODAY NEWS (May
6, 2013, 6:28 AM), http://www.today.com/news/casey-anthony-judge-felt-shock-disbelief-notguilty-verdict-6C9791042 (reporting on criticism of the not-guilty verdict in the Casey Anthony
trial); see also Carol D. Leonnig & Jenna Johnson, Anger Flows at Acquittal of George Zimmerman
in
Death
of
Trayvon
Martin,
WASH.
POST
(July
14,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/anger-flows-at-acquittal-of-george-zimmerman-indeath-of-trayvon-martin/2013/07/14/e1a1216a-ec98-11e2-bed3-b9b6fe264871_story.html
(discussing criticism over the jury verdict in the death of Trayvon Martin). On January 27, 2015, I
performed a search on “Bing” for “Outrageous Jury Verdicts.” The database reported 1,240 results.
I then searched on “Bing” for “Abolish jury system”—a Bing-suggested search that therefore
resulted in relevant results without needing to filter by putting the search terms in quotation
marks—had 637,000 results.
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the time.282
Juries do get things wrong, albeit not with the frequency one might
suppose. As Professor Bruce Spencer notes: “[D]irect assessments of
accuracy are not possible on a wide scale because only atypically is the
correct verdict known, and it is difficult to generalize from those cases to
the more typical cases where the correct verdict is not knowable.”283 But
Spencer nonetheless uses accuracy as a starting point to estimate a
statistically defensible model of jury accuracy, and concludes that jury
error rates are roughly 10 percent.284 This is in accord with the work of
many researchers who conclude that juries typically reach reasoned and
informed decisions.285 A broad review of the statistical and other social
science research concludes that jurors are competent decision makers.286
Without regard to the accuracy of public perception regarding the
frequency of jury error, the presence of public perception of jury error is
empirically verifiable. In one study, 320 individuals were given
descriptions of the same trial and verdict, with the only variables being a
homogenous or heterogeneous jury, and a guilty or not guilty verdict.
The study found a material increase in the perception of an inaccurate
verdict when all-white juries found a defendant guilty.287 For a social
scientist, what is of interest here are the reasons for community
perceptions of inaccurate jury verdicts; for this Article’s purposes, this
study confirms the prevalence of community perceptions that juries get
things wrong.288
What is unclear—in the absence of legitimacy research—is the
relationship of the perception of jury error to legitimacy. Americans have
long perceived juries as deeply flawed. In the ratification debates of the
proposed Constitution of the United States, it was suggested that juries

282. See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury
Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 742−43 (1990−1991) (discussing the influences on the perception
of juror inadequacy). This is far from a new criticism. At the time the early Americans were
considering juries for inclusion in the proposed Constitution, jurors were described as decisionmakers “by chance,” “stupid,” “unprincipled,” and potentially imposing injustice by “ignorance or
knavery.” See Klein, supra note 52, at 1096 (discussing the Federalists and Anti-Federalists view
of juries).
283. Spencer, supra note 146, at 306.
284. Id. at 310–15, 326–28.
285. Cecil, supra note 282, at 745–46.
286. Id. at 745–64.
287. Ellis, supra note 185, at 1043–50.
288. See generally Daniels, supra note 281 (discussing the prevalence of the perception that
juries render incorrect verdicts).
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were not “fair.”289 Jurors were characterized as “ignorant”290 and said to
be unable to “distinguish between right and wrong.”291 Jurors were also
described as decision makers “by chance,”292 “stupid,”293
“unprincipled,”294 and potentially imposing injustice by “ignorance or
knavery.”295 Yet these concerns did not cause the framers to eliminate
trial by jury to have a legitimate justice system; to the contrary, trial by
jury is enshrined in the Constitution three times.296
The justice system intentionally and consistently reflects a preference
for jurors over judge as decision makers.297 Contemporary reform of the
role and scope of jury trials, however, suggests that public trust in juries
has turned. Legislative reform, such as increasing burdens of proof to
recover punitive damages,298 eliminating or capping the right to recover
some forms of damages,299 or increasing the thresholds to find some
forms of liability,300 are all examples of dissatisfaction with jury verdicts
resulting in what has now been called “the vanishing trial.”301
So, in the absence of empirical research, it is hard to formulate a
reasonable hypothesis about the expected relationship of juries to
legitimacy. There is ample evidence of dissatisfaction with the accuracy
of dispute resolution through trial by jury, but there is ambiguity about
whether judges are perceived as any better, and one likely knows that
concern regarding judges has not undermined their legitimacy.
289. REMARKS OF JOHN MARSHALL ON JUNE 20, 1788, DURING THE VIRGINIA STATE
CONVENTION CONCERNING RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 540, 543 (Neil H. Cogan ed.,
1997).
290. A FARMER, NO. 4, MARCH 21, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 579, 581 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. ARISTOCROTIS, APRIL 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS,
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 582, 582 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
294. A [NEW HAMPSHIRE] FARMER, NO. 3, JUNE 6, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 586, 586 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
295. Id.
296. U.S. CONST. art. III; U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
297. Klein, supra note 52, at 1098.
298. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.
299. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 412–15 (2005) (exploring the effect of medical malpractice damages
caps).
300. See, e.g., Brian S. Sommer, Note, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance
in the Private Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J.
413, 420–425 (2004–2005) (describing congressional attempts to impair securities class actions).
301. See, e.g., Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., at v (2004),
(publishing fifteen articles addressing the vanishing trial phenomena).
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d. Conclusions About Fragility of Trial Court Legitimacy
As noted above, there is thin extant scholarship on the resiliency or
fragility of trial court legitimacy. That work focuses on judges, and
suggests that because of concerns with judge neutrality, there is some
fragility to perceptions of legitimacy. One can formulate a tentative
hypothesis that perceptions of lawyers may add to that fragility, but one
should be more hesitant to formulate a similar hypothesis about juries.
One theme that emerges from all of these contexts is that whatever
legitimacy the courts do have, it rests on a premise that the courts are
trying to get to a just, fair, and accurate result, colloquially speaking,
pretty much all of the time.
B. Truth in Courts and Legitimacy Fragility
As the explication of the meaning of truth in courts developed, courts
tempered fairness with the need for finality, and intentionally delimited
fact-based decisions in deference to other, external values. In another
way, two of the four legitimacy factors identified by Professors Cann and
Yates—belief that courts provide equal justice and belief that decisions
are based on fact and law—are undermined if the public becomes aware
of what courts do.302 Professors Cann and Yates found that “greater
knowledge regarding one’s state courts actually decreases their
perceptions of court legitimacy.”303
That is particularly troubling if there is reason to be concerned that
unfamiliarity is eroding. There is a variety of indicators that the
community is becoming increasingly more aware of what happens in trial
courts. Most directly, there is surprisingly more personal experience with
the courts across the nation’s population. More than one-third of eligible
Americans will serve as a juror at least once in their lifetime.304
Beyond this direct personal experience, the public has at least surface
level awareness of a variety of court cases through media reports. Trials
with ironic frequency gain sufficient boosts in public perception to
become, at least for a time, part of the public lexicon as the “trial of the
century.” Just a few of the cases labeled “trial of the century” in the last
one hundred years (as of the writing of this Article) are the trial of Sacco
302. The other two are: (1) belief that judges are trustworthy and honest, and (2) belief that
judges are fair. Cann & Yates, supra note 232, at 305.
303. Id. at 314. In more recent work, Cann and Yates have found inopposite results. Email
from Jeff Yates, Professor, Binghamton Univ., to author (May 29, 2015) (on file with author).
304. HON. GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE STATE-OF-THE
STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 8 (2007),
http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx.
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and Vanzetti,305 the trial of Leopold and Loeb,306 the “Scopes Monkey
Trial,”307 the Lindbergh baby kidnapping trial,308 the Nuremberg
trials,309 the Sam Sheppard murder trial,310 the O.J. Simpson murder
trial,311 the impeachment trial of President Clinton,312 the antitrust trial
of Microsoft,313 and the trial of Michael Jackson.314 As attorney F. Lee
Bailey quipped in 1999, “every time I turn around, there’s a new trial of
the century.”315
But the work of the justice system can become part of the public
lexicon even short of sensationalist tags. In a forty-six-month period, the
murder trials of Casey Anthony,316 Jody Arias,317 and the so-called
“American Sniper” killer318 all dominated the news cycle in quick
succession. Less prurient, but nonetheless generally followed, civil trials
of recent vintage include the intellectual property battles between Apple
and Samsung,319 the trial concerning Research in Motion’s (“RIM”)
patent rights to the Blackberry electronic device,320 as well as a personalinjury lawsuit known as the “McDonalds coffee case.”321
305. JOHN DAVIS, SACCO AND VANZETTI: REBEL LIVES 1 (2004) (“Within a year it was going
to become the ‘trial of the century.’”).
306. Douglas O. Linder, The Leopold and Loeb Trial: A Brief Account, U. MO.-KAN. CITY
(1997),
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/leoploeb/Accountoftrial.html
(“[T]he
Leopold and Loeb trial has the elements to justify its billing as the first ‘trial of the century.’”).
307. Peter Carlson, (The Last) Trial of the Century, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at C01.
308. Id.
309. Joseph Canon, The Real Trial of the Century, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/books/the-real-trial-of-the-century.html.
310. Carlson, supra note 307.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Michael Ventre, O.J. Case Will Pale in Comparison to Jackson Trial, TODAY (Jan. 30,
2005, 1:17 PM), http://www.today.com/id/6877844/ns/today-entertainment/t/oj-case-will-palecomparison-jackson-trial/.
315. Carlson, supra note 307, at C01.
316. Casey Anthony Trial Fast Facts, CNN LIBR. (June 29, 2016, 10:13 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/04/us/casey-anthony-trial-fast-facts/index.html.
317. Jodi Arias News, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/topics/news/jodi-arias.htm.
318. Tasha Tsiaperas, Trial for Man Accused of Killing ‘American Sniper’ Chris Kyle Begins
in
Stephenville,
DALL.
MORNING
NEWS
(Feb.
11,
2015,
8:10
AM),
http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2015/02/testimony-begins-wednesday-morning-in-americansniper-trial.html/.
319. Apple. Samsung Electronics Agree to Drop Patent Lawsuits Outside U.S., HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 5, 2014, 11:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/05/apple-samsung-droplawsuit_n_5653206.html.
320. Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million Settlement, CNN MONEY (Mar. 3,
2006, 7:29 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/.
321. Andrea Gerlin, Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9
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Technology nurtures and grows this general communal awareness of
what happens in courts. By 2008 (still relatively early days in the context
of ubiquitous access to the Internet), trial strategy consultants observed,
“[v]irtually every trial is newsworthy to someone and can therefore end
up on the Internet . . . .”322 Indeed, this very concern has led to a host of
academic and judicial introspection about a proper procedural response
to the impact of the Internet on jurors—both pretrial and during trial.323
The courts provide a seemingly endless source of public fascination, and
as a consequence there is broad—albeit potentially shallow—general
public awareness of what happens in courts.
And then, of course, there is the impact of electronic media. Popular
television series such as CSI have caused enormous angst among lawyers
and judges about the impact of popular media on the expectations of trial
jurors.324 This angst is grounded in the understanding that the public has
an awareness, and a general set of preconceptions, about what it believes,
rightly or wrongly, happens in courts.
There is even research suggesting that this broad awareness of what
happens in courts is not entirely shallow. There is some evidence of
people fashioning their specific behavior in response to how that behavior
might be evaluated in a future trial. Professors Gideon Parchomovsky
and Alex Stein discuss and analyze instances when potential future
litigants have the opportunity—assuming they are aware of what happens
in courts—to create beneficial potential evidence.325
Professors

Million—McDonald’s Callousness Was Real Issue, Jurors Say, In Case of Burned Woman—How
Hot Do You Like It, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1.
322. Ellen Brickman et al., How Juror Internet Use Has Changed the American Jury Trial, 1 J.
CT. INNOVATION 287, 292 (2008).
323. See generally Daniel William Bell, Comment, Juror Misconduct and the Internet, 38 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 81 (2010–2011) (suggesting that the proper way to prevent juries from conducting
outside research is by providing daily judicial instructions); Steven Wallace, The Internet Infects
the Courtroom, 93 JUDICATURE 138 (2010) (recommending several methods of minimizing juror
Internet use including repeated jury instructions, questions about Internet use during voir dire and
juror penalties); Amanda McGee, Comment, Juror Misconduct in The Twenty-First Century: The
Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301
(2009–2010) (recommending a variety of court-imposed solutions and juror peer monitoring);
Marcy Zora, Note, The Real Social Network: How Jurors’ Use of Social Media and Smart Phones
Affects a Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 577 (2012) (advocating that
courts should establish punishments for jurors who conduct outside Internet research or post about
confidential information on social media).
324. See Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2009) (discussing the impact the
television program CSI has on jury deliberations and outcomes).
325. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary
Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 530–42 (2010) (analyzing the distortionary effect of evidentiary
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Parchomovsky and Stein detail examples of persons from a variety of
legal contexts (i.e., property law, patent law, criminal law, and tort law)
with sufficient awareness of the evidentiary treatment of actions that they
modify their behavior to maximize future trial outcomes.326 Professors
Parchomovsky and Stein conclude that people in the general community
make choices—indeed, sometimes economically “suboptimal” choices—
based on their fear of how those choices might be used in a trial.327 In
other words, at a level far more consequential than amusement with
telenovela-like courtroom dramas, there is increasing societal awareness
of what happens in courts.
Are there presently concrete examples of this awareness eroding
legitimacy? Arguably, there is exactly the opposite.
Legitimacy Theory would predict that if the community accepts the
courts as legitimate, then when there is a perception that the courts are
getting things wrong, the community either will do nothing, or will work
within normal institutional channels (as opposed to acts of civil
disobedience) to recalibrate the system.328 And it appears that
Legitimacy Theory predictions of behavior actualize in reality: a
community that accepts courts as legitimate either will do nothing, or will
work within normal institutional channels (as opposed to acts of civil
disobedience) to recalibrate the system. Indeed, it ubiquitously reads like
an Old Testament list of who begat whom.
In civil litigation, the assertion that the system is out of balance is
usually expressed by the pejorative phrasing of a “litigation crisis,” or a
concern with rampant “frivolous litigation.” These concerns often
emerge through advocacy for “reform” to reign in a runaway system.
Concerns with an explosion of inmate litigation begat the Prison
Litigation Reform Act.329 Concerns with patent “trolls” triggered calls
for procedural reform of patent laws.330 Concerns with the abuse of
antitrust litigation caused its own procedural reform.331 A perceived
explosion in asbestos litigation inspired calls to take all such claims out
motivations).
326. Id. at 532–34.
327. Id. at 518.
328. EASTON, supra note 203, at 278–80, 285–86.
329. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1558–59 (2003)
(describing the purpose and method of passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
330. See, e.g., Michael J, Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 510–11 (2003) (“IP law probably needs to follow the
same path as antitrust law by taking stronger substantive and procedural steps to mitigate the harm
from rent-seeking through litigation.”).
331. Id.
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of Article III courts.332 Asserted extortive securities litigation prompted
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.333 The generic assertion of
frivolous litigation334 generated calls for massive tort reform,335
procedural reform,336 increased burdens of proof to recover punitive
damages,337 the elimination or capping of the right to recover some forms
of damages,338 and the increasing of thresholds to find some forms of
liability.339
Persistent recalibration of the courts in response to accuracy concerns
is a pattern on the criminal side as well. The perceived erratic sentencing
patterns of judges prompted mandatory sentencing guidelines.340 The
perceived inability of the traditional legal system to handle terrorism
332. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative
Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1991–1992) (discussing possible administrative
alternatives to the tort system).
333. See Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing
with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1999)
(analyzing the purpose of the Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
334. See generally Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3
(1986–1987) (discussing the dramatic increase in frivolous litigation).
335. See Benjamin R. Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice,
Needless Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40, 40 (1986–1987) (detailing tort reform and
how to efficiently handle claims); Thomas A. Eaton, Of Frivolous Litigation and Runaway Juries:
A View from the Bench, 41 GA. L. REV. 431, 432 (2006–2007) (examining tort reform from the
perspective of trial judges).
336. See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical
Review of Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (1993–1994)
(analyzing the use of sanctions to combat frivolous litigation); John W. Wade, On Frivolous
Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433, 492
(1985–1986) (describing the development of procedural law and its relation to frivolous litigation).
337. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (1992).
338. Sharkey, supra note 299, at 412–15; David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and
Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2032
(2006).
339. See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 300, at 420–25 (describing judicial and congressional
attempts to impair securities class actions). See also David A. Logan, Juries, Judges, and the
Politics of Tort Reform, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 903, 907–14 (2014–2015) (discussing legislative and
executive efforts to limit class action lawsuits in personal injury cases).
340. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 906 (1991) (“The principal argument for sentencing
guidelines is . . . they limit the play of judicial personality and inhibit discrimination on racial and
other grounds.”). See generally KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998) (discussing sentencing reform and the
subsequent sentencing guidelines). The guidelines worked—under the mandatory minimum
guidelines variation in sentencing materially shrunk; when the federal courts returned to advisory
sentencing guidelines, variance in judicial sentencing doubled. See Crystal S. Yang, Have
Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from
Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1271–75 (2014) (detailing how the implementation of guidelines
reduced sentencing disparities).
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evoked Guantanamo and military tribunals.341 The perceived inability of
normal criminal procedure to resolve childhood sexual abuse claims
motivated revised statutes of limitation.342 The “insanity” acquittal of
John Hinckley inspired the reform of the Federal Rule of Evidence
704(b).343
This is not to say that there are no instances of civil disobedience in
response to concerns of how the law is implemented or interpreted. The
Civil Rights movement of the 1960s is a stark example.344 Another
example comes from the annual protests against the Supreme Court
because of the Roe v. Wade345 decision.346 Yet the broad sweep of
American history all stands for the resilient institutional legitimacy of the
trial courts.
So what can one conclude about the relationship between legitimacy
and truth in courts? If, as this Article posits, truth in courts means
something different from colloquial understandings of accuracy, then
does the dissonance between what the public believes courts do and what
courts actually do expose a weakness in the legitimacy of the courts?347
One can at least seek to validate or refute that hypothesis anecdotally.
341. See generally Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions,
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1407
(2001–2002) (cautioning against the use of military tribunals for trying suspected terrorists);
George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 635 (2001–2002) (discussing issues with the use of military tribunals for
terrorists); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (discussing the Constitutional consequences of military
tribunals for the trial of terrorists); Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L.
& COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004) (discussing whether the military tribunals meet the minimum international
standards for a fair trial).
342. See generally Jorge L. Carro & Joseph V. Hatala, Recovered Memories, Extended Statutes
of Limitations and Discovery Exceptions in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: Have We Gone Too
Far?, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1239 (1995–1996) (discussing extended statutes of limitations in childhood
sexual abuse cases).
343. See, e.g., Anne Lawson Braswell, Resurrection of the Ultimate Issue Rule: Federal Rule
of Evidence 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 620, 620 (1986–1987)
(“Prompted by public reaction to the jury’s not guilty by reason of insanity verdict of would-be
presidential assassin John Hinckley, Jr., Congress amended Federal Rule of Evidence 704 in
1984.”).
344. See generally Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political
Uses of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233 (2005) (discussing civil disobedience during the Civil Rights
Movement).
345. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have a fundamental
right to abortion).
346. See MARCH FOR LIFE, https://marchforlife.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (discussing the
pro-life movement and opportunities to organize and demonstrate).
347. See Nesson, supra note 195, at 1379 (arguing the public will not defer to a judge’s decision
that amounts to a probability based bet on what happened).
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Much has been, and will be, written on the shooting of Michael Brown
and the aftermath, but in short form, Michael Brown’s death lit a
firestorm of public attention on police encounters with persons of color,
which led to weeks of protests in Ferguson, Missouri, resulting in protests
nationwide, in turn leading to attention on other apparently similar police
encounters (most notably, the choking death of Eric Garner in New York
City) and protests concerning those encounters, leading to focus and
protests concerning the grand jury evaluations of the encounters, and
culminating serious discussion at high institutional levels of reform
regarding grand juries and their processes.348 The essential allegation
was that when the actor was a police officer and the victim was a person
of color, the likelihood that criminal charges would be brought was
remote—much less there being a conviction and sentence.349 Or,
similarly, there was civil discord in response to the perception that values
other than “a search for the truth” distorted the likelihood of reaching a
correct outcome.350
348. See, e.g., Audio tape: Webinar on Grand Jury Reform, Post-Ferguson, held by the Young
Lawyers Division, American Bar Association (Mar. 17, 2015); see generally Robert Gavin, Grand
Jury Reform Call: Top Judge Asks Judicial Role in Cases of Death or Near-death of Civilians by
Cops, TIMESUNION (Feb. 17, 2015, 1:25 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Topjudge-wants-big-grand-jury-changes-in-police-6085342.php (“In the wake of polarizing grand jury
decisions in the police-related deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner, New York’s top judge
wants judges to oversee the grand jury process in cases involving deadly and near-deadly incidents
involving police and civilians.”); Ben Kesling, Missouri Governor Announces Creation of
‘Ferguson Commission’, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/missourigovernor-announces-creation-of-ferguson-commission-1413914495 (reporting on the Missouri
governor creating a regional commission to study systemic inequality in the wake of the Ferguson
protests); Lee Van Der Voo, Grand Jury Reform Propelled by Ferguson, INVESTIGATEWEST (Dec.
29, 2014), http://www.invw.org/article/grand-jury-reform-propell-1490 (discussing the grand jury
proceeding relating to the police officer shooting of Aaron Campbell).
349. See, e.g., David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict
Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-statenisland-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html?_r=0.r=0 (discussing the aftermath of a grand jury
finding there was not enough evidence to charge police officer Daniel Pantaleo in the death of Eric
Garner).
350. That perception largely was affirmed when on March 4, 2015, the United States
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division released its Investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department, which included among its findings:
Ferguson has allowed its focus on revenue generation to fundamentally compromise the
role of Ferguson’s municipal court. The municipal court does not act as a neutral arbiter
of the law or a check on unlawful police conduct. Instead, the court primarily uses its
judicial authority as the means to compel the payment of fines and fees that advance the
City’s financial interests. This has led to court practices that violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process and equal protection requirements. The court’s practices also
impose unnecessary harm, overwhelmingly on African-American individuals, and run
counter to public safety.

7.5_KLEIN_DOCUMENT1 (1-79).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

72

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

1/16/17 12:01 PM

[Vol. 48

The Brown/Garner rounds of public protest echo the reaction to the
verdict in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson.351 A common explanation of
the verdict—and the reaction to the verdict—is the possibility that a
murderer was let free not because he was innocent, but rather to send a
message to the Los Angeles Police Department about police practices.352
The Simpson protests and the Brown/Garner protests were a more
muted version of the protests after the state court acquittal of police
officers for the beating of Rodney King.353 Those were dramatic
examples of a nontrivial percentage of public disagreement with
compromising the likelihood of accurate verdicts in response to arguably
broader racial dynamics; in other words, that the jury intentionally
eschewed finding O.J. Simpson guilty to send a message to the Los
Angeles Police Department.
One can identify examples of civil discord in response to the
perception of the system factoring nonaccuracy values into the decision
process. But are there also examples of passive acceptance of the system
factoring nonaccuracy values into the decision-making process?
An example of passive acceptance of the system factoring nonaccuracy
values into the decision process is criminal exclusionary rules. One
feature of the criminal justice system is the set of doctrines excluding
evidence improperly gathered, such as a failure to give Miranda
warnings.354 One can postulate that there is broad, shallow public
awareness of these doctrines through the colloquial phrasing, “got off on
a technicality.”355 But the primary reaction to these doctrines, outside of
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.pdf.
351. See generally JEWELLE TAYLOR GIBBS, RACE AND JUSTICE: RODNEY KING AND O.J.
SIMPSON IN A HOUSE DIVIDED (1996) (discussing protests after the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson
Trials); John Fiske, Admissible Postmodernity: Some Remarks on Rodney King, O.J. Simpson, and
Contemporary Culture, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 917 (1995–1996) (analyzing the relationship between
popular culture and the courtroom in the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson trials).
352. Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffman, Public Perception, Justice, and “The Search for
Truth” in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1267, 1267–68 (1995–1996).
353. Id. at 1270.
354. See Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates:
Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON. 157, 157–79 (2003)
(discussing the negative impacts of exclusionary rules of evidence); Nardulli, supra note 107, at
585–609 (discussing the societal cost of search and seizure exclusionary rules). See generally
William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981–1982) (discussing the
Fourth Amendment exclusion of improperly gathered evidence).
355. See,
e.g.,
Off
on
a
Technicality,
TV
TROPES,
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/OffOnATechnicality (examining how the media
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legal academics and courts, is media-driven grousing, instead of anything
approaching deep concerns for legitimacy. Further, even the grousing
arguably is a tool for other agendas, rather than an indicator of legitimacy
concerns. Technicality acquittals only seem troublesome when they drive
accuracy outcomes with which the complainer disagrees. Put another
way, the same person who complains that an accused arms trafficker “got
off on a technicality” may express no concern when Oliver North—
charged with being a central figure in the “arms for hostages” “IranContra Affair”356—got off on a technicality357 (North was indicted, tried,
and convicted of three criminal counts; his conviction was reversed based
on findings of Fifth Amendment violations and improper jury
instructions).358
None of these examples supports drawing definitive conclusions. It is
a profound logical fallacy to draw conclusions from retrospective
anecdotal events. Consider a person who buys a lottery ticket every day
from the same local convenience store, and never wins. Then, two days
in a row, the same person buys a ticket from a gas station in another town.
Both tickets win. This is not evidence that the gas station sells winning
tickets and the convenience store does not. At best, it is a suggestion of
something that bears exploration through collection of good data in a
properly structured study.
But what all of this does expose is a dissonance between the judicial
system’s self-articulation of the system’s commitment to accuracy, and
the public’s perception of the courts. The work of “Innocence Projects”
might best illustrate this phenomenon. According to the National
Registry of Exonerations, a project of the University of Michigan, the
year 2014 had a record number of exonerations (125), continuing a broad
year-to-year upward trend since 1989.359 Surely, the primary motivation
behind Innocence Projects is the chance to save an innocent convict on
death row. But secondarily, the motivation behind Innocence Projects is
to demonstrate to the public—in a way that cannot be denied—the
depicts criminal exclusionary rules).
356. See American Experience, General Article: The Iran Contra Affair, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/reagan-iran/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2016) (providing background on the Iran-Contra Affair).
357. See
Oliver
North,
SOURCEWATCH,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Oliver_North (last updated June 27, 20109)
(summarizing the life of Oliver North).
358. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), amended by 920 F.2d 940 (1990).
359. The National Registrar of Exonerations, Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, U.
MICH. L. SCH. (Aug 29, 2016), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerationby-Year.aspx.
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possible horrors of capital punishment. That secondary goal only
resonates because of the premise that the public perception of the role of
the courts is one seeking just, fair, and accurate results (in a colloquial
sense of those words). It is hard to imagine that the public sentiment
would be, while faced with post-conviction affidavits showing an
accused’s actual innocence, that the convict was (in the words of the
Supreme Court) “not innocent, in any sense of the word.”360
CONCLUSION
In Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, he described the recent amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as predicated on the idea that cost-efficient, speedy
dispute resolution is necessary to justice:
Our Nation’s courts are today’s guarantors of justice. . . . [L]awyers . .
. have an affirmative duty . . . with the court, to achieve prompt and
efficient resolutions of disputes. . . . [W]e must engineer a change in our
legal culture that places a premium on the public’s interest in speedy,
fair, and efficient justice.361

This notion—equating efficiency, affordability, and finality with
justice—underlies the strong affinity of the courts for procedural
streamlining. Courts are animating a view that it serves justice to—
within constitutional constraints—deploy every available tool to
maximize litigation as an efficient and affordable direct line to finality.
Hence, the system encounters, among many other “reforms,” reduction
in jury size, pressure to settle or arbitrate, compression of open discovery
rights, crimping of habeas corpus justifications, dismissal of factually
sufficient claims as “implausible,” strict preservation of error standards
to support appellate reversal, and heightened thresholds for convictionreversal based on prosecutorial misconduct.
But each of these incremental steps toward justice is an incremental
step away from the probability that a judgment of what occurred in a case
corresponds to what actually occurred. For example, the amendment to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) to “crystalize[] . . . the common-

360. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (emphasis added). Herrera v. Collins, and
the view of innocence the Court enunciated in Herrera, is not an idiosyncratic instance. See
Bhardia v. State, 774 S.E. 2d 90, 96 (Ga. 2015) (holding that the trial court properly denied the
extraordinary motion for new trial to introduce DNA evidence of innocence of rape because
defendant’s inadequate showing of newly discovered evidence could not have been found with due
diligence).
361. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3,
6, 11, http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf.
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sense concept of proportionality [which will] eliminate unnecessary or
wasteful discovery . . . [which] may require the active involvement of a
neutral arbiter—the federal judge,”362 but inevitably also will foreclose
discovery of an indeterminate body of apparently wasteful but actually
insightful discovery that would have advanced the accurate determination
of what objectively happened in a dispute.
Is this a step away from or toward discerning, in any individual case,
the truth?” Well, that depends on what is meant by truth. And therein
lies the point. What this Article proposes is that refinements in
procedural justice move cases closer to what courts mean by truth but
move cases further away from what, colloquially, truth generally means.
Or alternatively, system insiders equate truth with justice, but for system
outsiders, the two terms have different meanings.
The move toward more procedural justice at the expense of some
colloquial truth might prove sound public policy. But so long as it is not
transparent public policy garnering large public support, it can come at
an enormous cost. That cost is the erosion of judicial legitimacy—of
judicial truth. And that is a cost that has yet to be accounted for in the
consideration of further procedural streamlining of the judicial process.
APPENDIX A
Country
Armenia
Australia

Jury
System363
None.364

Hearsay Evidence

Character Evidence

No ban.

No ban.

Only used
when the
charge is a
serious
crime.365

Ban with
exceptions.366

Admissible if
probative value
substantially
outweighs prejudicial
effect.367

362. Id. at 6–7.
363. For our purposes, “jury system” means a system where lay jurors act as fact finders,
deliberate, and issue verdicts. This table does not distinguish between “mixed systems” (where lay
assessors serve with professional judges or where laypersons deliberate with professional judges),
and systems with no lay participation. For a discussion on variations of lay participation around
the world, see Steven J. Colby, Note, A Jury for Israel?: Determining When a Lay Jury System is
Ideal in a Heterogeneous Country, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 121, 124–25 (2014).
364. MARIJKA MALSCH, DEMOCRACY IN THE COURTS: LAY PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 57 (2009).
365. Ethan J. Leib, A Comparison of Criminal Jury Decision Rules in Democratic Countries, 5
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 629, 635 (2008).
366. Commonwealth Evidence Act 1995 s 63, 65 (Austl.).
367. Id. at s 49.

7.5_KLEIN_DOCUMENT1 (1-79).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

76

1/16/17 12:01 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Country
Chile
China

Czech
Republic
England

Germany
Honduras

[Vol. 48

Jury
System363
None.368
None.369

Hearsay Evidence

Character Evidence

No ban.
Ban,370 but judges
have discretion to
admit.371

None.373

No ban.

No ban.
Ban on propensity
evidence, modeled
after Federal Rules of
Evidence.372
No ban.

Only used in a
small
percentage of
criminal
trials.374

Explicitly
admissible in civil
trials.375 Ban with
exceptions in
criminal trials.376
No ban.
No ban, but in
criminal trials there
is a preference for
non-hearsay
evidence.380

None.378
None.379

No ban in civil trials.
Ban with exceptions
in criminal trials.377

No ban.
No ban.

368. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CHILE 2013: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 7 (2014),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220640.pdf.
369. John J. Capowski, China’s Evidentiary and Procedural Reforms, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and the Harmonization of Civil and Common Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 455, 471 (2012).
370. Uniform Provisions of Evidence of the People’s Court (promulgated by Inst. of Evidence
Law and Forensic Sci., CUPL, Oct. 8, 2007) art. 28 (China).
371. Id. art. 32.
372. Id. arts. 33–34. See generally Capowski, supra note 369 (discussing why China, a civil
law country with no jury system, has modeled its first evidentiary code after the United States’
Federal Rules of Evidence).
373. Ivana Borzova, Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems 2013: Czech Republic, EUR.
COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUST. 13 (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/Czech%20Rep_2014.pdf.
374. Leib, supra note 365, at 636.
375. Civil Evidence Act 1995, c. 38, § 1 (Eng.).
376. Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, § 114 (Eng.).
377. Id. at § 101.
378. Colby, supra note 363, at 125.
379. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HONDURAS 2013: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 9 (2013),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220663.pdf.
380. Decreto No. 189-84, CÓDIGO PENAL [Criminal Code] [CÓD. PEN.] art. 199 (Chile). Most
other Latin American evidence codes do not even recognize hearsay or character as evidentiary
issues. KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A
CASE BOOK 52 (1975); Daniel Pulecio-Boek, The Genealogy of Prosecutorial Discretion in Latin
America: A Comparative and Historical Analysis of the Adversarial Reforms in the Region, 13
RICHMOND J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 67, 101 (2014).
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Jury
System363
None.381

Hearsay Evidence

Character Evidence

Explicitly
admissible in
criminal trials.382

Jamaica

For serious
crimes only.384

Korea

In criminal
trials, juries
render
“advisory
opinions”
which judges
are not bound
to follow.386

New Zealand

Only used in a
small
percentage of

Explicitly
admissible, except
in criminal trials,
oral hearsay is
inadmissible if the
declarant is
available to
testify.385
Prior to the advent
of the criminal
jury, there were no
exclusionary rules.
Now, there are
some per se rules
barring hearsay and
other types of
unfairly prejudicial
evidence.387
Ban with
exceptions.389

No ban. Explicitly
admissible in
determining
punishment in
criminal cases.383
No ban.

Iran

No ban.

Explicitly admissible,
except in criminal
trials, the prosecution
may offer such
evidence only where

381. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, IRAN 2013: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 12, (2013),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220564.pdf.
382. ISLAMIC PENAL CODE [2012], arts. 162, 171, 176, 187, 188 (Iran).
383. Id. arts. 38(e), 60, 64.
384. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JAMAICA 2013: HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 10 (2013),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/220666.pdf.
385. Evidence Act, §§ 31C–31E (Jam.).
386. Hon. Antoinette Plogstedt, E-Jurors: A View from the Bench, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 597,
601 (2013).
387. See Eric Ilhyung Lee, Expert Evidence in the Republic of Korea and Under the U.S.
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Comparative Study, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 585, 601
(1997) (noting “the absence of provisions on issues such as relevance and hearsay” in the Korean
rules of evidence); Ryan Y. Park, The Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons and Insights from Korea, 58
AM J. INT’L L. 525, 554 (2010) (“The advent of jury trials was accompanied by more stringent per
se rules on issues such as hearsay.”).
389. Evidence Act 2006, § 18 (N.Z.).
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Country

Jury
System363
trials.388

Hearsay Evidence

Poland
Scotland

None.391
Only used in a
small
percentage of
criminal
trials.392

Slovenia

None.396

South Africa

None.398

Sweden
Tanzania

None.400
None.401

No ban.
Explicitly
admissible in civil
trials.393 Ban with
exceptions in
criminal trials.394
Explicitly
admissible in civil
trials.397 No ban in
criminal trials.
Ban with
exceptions giving
judge discretion.399
No ban.
Ban with
exceptions.402

[Vol. 48

Character Evidence
its probative value
outweighs the risk of
unfair prejudice.390
No ban.
No ban in civil trials.
Broadly allowed in
criminal trials.395

No ban.

No ban.

No ban.
Ban, except
admissible for
determining damages

388. Neil Cameron, Susan Potter, & Warren Young, The New Zealand Jury, 62 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 103, 138 (1999).
390. Id. at §§ 40(2), 43(1).
391. Colby, supra note 363, at 125.
392. Leib, supra note 365, at 637.
393. Civil Evidence (Scotland) Act 1988, § 2(1).
394. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, § 259.
395. Id. at § 270.
396. Jasa Vrabec (Head of the Office for Court Management), Scheme for Evaluating Judicial
Systems 2013: Slovenia, EUR. COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUST. (CEPEJ), 20–21, (Sept. 10,
2014), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/Slovenia_2014.pdf.
397. Civil Procedure Act of 2004 art. 4 (ZPP-UPB2) (Slov.).
398. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 165, 173 (2006).
399. Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 § 3 (S. Afr.).
400. Malin Kall (Legal Advisor) et al., Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems 2013: Sweden,
EUR. COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUST. (CEPEJ), 16, (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/Sweden_2014.pdf.
401. WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 424 (Neil Vidmar, ed., 2000).
402. The Evidence Act 1967, §§ 34–39 (Tanz.). The Evidence Act fails to distinguish relevancy
from hearsay; several provisions referring to “relevant” evidence are actually categories of
admissible hearsay. Ronald J. Allen et al., Reforming the Law of Evidence of Tanzania (Part Two):
Conceptual Overview and Practical Steps, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 37 (2014).
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Country

Turkey
Zimbabwe

1/16/17 12:01 PM

Truth and Legitimacy
Jury
System363
None.404
None.405

Hearsay Evidence

No ban.
Explicitly
admissible in civil
cases.406 Ban with
exceptions in
criminal cases.407

79
Character Evidence
in civil trials.403
No ban.
Broadly
admissible.408

403. The Evidence Act 1967, § 54 (Tanz.).
404. Ibrahim Cetin (Judge), Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems 2013: Turkey, EUR,
COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUST. (CEPEJ), 18, (Sept. 10, 2014)
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/Sweden_2014.pdf.
405. ZIMBABWE: INJUSTICE AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION 110 (Brian Raftopoulous &
Tyrone Savage eds., 2004).
406. Civil Evidence Act, (Act No. 22/2001) § 27 (Zim.).
407. Hearsay evidence is admissible in criminal trials if it would be in England. Criminal
Procedure & Evidence Act, (Act No. 67/1938) § 253 (Zim.).
408. Civil Evidence Act, (Act No. 22/2001) § 33 (Zim.); Criminal Procedure & Evidence Act,
(Act No. 67/1938) § 260 (Zim.).

